

FAITH AND FREEDOM



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The Anomaly of Christian Aggressiveness

J. S. K. PATRICK

TO what extent have we to thank Christianity for the state of the world to-day? Has her influence during the last 2,000 years been ineffective, as is commonly, though perhaps quite wrongly, supposed? Or has it been effective and bad? I want to put Christianity in the dock. I want to say to her: it was you who massacred in concentration camps the Germans of whom Hitler did not approve; you dropped the atomic bombs on Japan; you caused the wars from which European civilisation has not yet recovered, if, indeed, she ever can recover.

We Christians are so hopelessly complacent about our religion. We so easily assume that all the problems of the world would be solved if only we could persuade the other sheep to join our fold. We assume the guiltlessness of Christianity: "My religion can do no wrong"—an idea perhaps dangerously akin to "My country right or wrong."

An American, Dr. Robert Ernest Hume, wrote a book a number of years ago entitled *The World's Living Religions*. At the end of each chapter he gave a list of what he considered to be the essential strong points and the essential weaknesses of each religion in turn—Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth. But when he came to his own religion he saw no essential weaknesses in her. We Christians have not yet laid the ghost of infallibility. This assurance of the infallibility of our revelation and therefore of the guiltlessness of our religion is an assumption which, in the light of our own history and deeds, we Christians have no right to make. It is a betrayal of truth and is closely connected with the evils from which we are to-day suffering.

Christianity belongs to an exclusive, aggressive, militant family, a family of three. Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all tarred with the same stick. Each is an exclusive religion. Judaism believes that she has the one and only true revelation, that Christianity is a kind of watered-down Judaism, the only kind of Judaism the mass of men is at the moment ready for, a milk that God in His mercy has prepared for mankind until it grows strong enough to take the strong meat of true Judaism. Islam believes that she has the one and only true revelation and that Christianity prepared the way for that revelation. The Christian Church believes that she has the one and only true revelation, and in the Church of England we pray every Good Friday—unless we are squeamish and illegally use the 1928 Prayer Book—for "*all Jews, Turks, Infidels and Hereticks*" that they may be rescued from ignorance, hard-

ness of heart and contempt of God's Word and fetched home to the fold of the true Israelites—although those Christians who have said "Amen" to that prayer have no doubt been as ignorant of, and hardened against the religions of the Jews and the Turks, and as contemptuous of the Talmud and the Koran as the Jews and the Turks were ignorant of, and hardened against, Christianity.

We Christians belong to a peculiarly exclusive family of religions, far removed, for example, from the "three friends" of Chinese art. Those of us who saw some of those exhibitions of Chinese art that toured the country during the war will remember how the three religions of China were depicted as the three friends, and the author of *Lady Precious Stream*, himself a Confucianist, told us once in a broadcast that while it was true that General Chiang Kai Shek was a Christian, he was a Christian in the Chinese way. That is to say, he considered himself a good Christian, but was as good a Confucianist, a Buddhist, and a Taoist. The religions of China are apparently as inclusive and as mutually friendly as those of the Judaic-Christian-Moslem group are mutually exclusive and hostile. If we behaved in our tradition as the religious Chinese have traditionally behaved, we should go to a Christian church to get baptised, to a Jewish synagogue to get married, and we should be buried from a Moslem mosque. But we Christians—to say nothing of Jews and Moslems—are so desperately narrow that not only are we absolutely certain that our own is the one and only true religion, but we quite probably are as absolutely certain that our own Christian group is the one and only true religion. Every loyal Roman Catholic must think in that way, and some Anglicans will tell us how eager they are to unite with other Christians, but, of course, that the other Christians must obviously first of all accept the fundamental Anglican presuppositions. Not all Anglicans belong to this narrow school. Indeed, tolerance is in some ways a peculiarly Anglican characteristic. There are some tolerant Christians in various groups. But if we are to be honest, we must admit that to a very large extent this tolerance does not owe its origin to anything in the essence of ecclesiastical Christianity. It exists among Christians to day in spite of it. We Christians are tolerant—in so far as we are tolerant to-day—not primarily because we are Christian but because we are weak, because the erstwhile contending sects are to-day no longer strong enough to contend.

But now to support the charge of war guilt and of war crime that I would make against Christianity. The National Socialist party in Germany was, as we all know, exclusive and aggressive in the extreme. But where did Adolf Hitler learn his exclusiveness and aggressiveness? He was brought up, as were almost all the leading Nazis, under Christian influences. In 1913 he joined a Christian political party in

Austria, and from the members of that Christian party he learned how to hate the Jews. And when Adolf Hitler died he was still a Christian. There is no evidence that he ever made any attempt to repudiate his church membership, nor did the Catholic Church ever once suggest the possibility of his excommunication.

Didn't we sometimes blush just a little during the war for some of our church leaders? Apparently they had forgotten that Christians had ever been intolerant and cruel, exclusive, barbarous, inhumane. They appeared not to have heard of the Inquisition. They didn't know that the great leaders of the Reformation, Luther, Calvin, and even Zwingli, saw nothing wrong in the murdering of those with whom they were in serious theological disagreement. They had never heard of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, after which the Pope went in solemn procession to the church of St. Louis to sing his *Te Deum* for the massacre by French Catholics in Paris of 4,000 French Protestants, and of many more thousands of Protestants throughout the provinces of France. The intense feeling that used to be aroused by definite religious convictions is to-day aroused by as definite political convictions, which are not, perhaps, so far removed from the religious convictions of the past as we sometimes imagine they are. Communist Russia is partly a breakaway from Christian Russia, it is also partly, and perhaps more fundamentally, the continuation of the Christian Russia of the past. It would appear to inherit two characteristics of traditional Christianity—exclusiveness and aggressiveness. Apart from the age-long mutual antagonism between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, could the Iron Curtain exist?

Now if all this is true, the first thing we need to do is to reconcile ourselves to its truth. It's easy enough to say that those aggressive people in the past weren't really Christians. But they thought they were Christians. They "professed and called themselves Christians." They sang their *Te Deums* for the St. Bartholomew's massacre in Christian churches. If we reserve the term "Christian" only for that which squares with our own conception of what Christians should be—then I'm afraid there aren't going to be many Christians left! We can't shirk our responsibilities like that. The Christian religion has *some* responsibility for *all* who profess and call themselves Christians and for all who have been seriously influenced by Christians.

Whether we like it or not, our religion has a history of exclusiveness and aggressiveness, exclusiveness both against other Christians and against those who are not Christian—for example, the Jews. After the dreadful massacre of Jews in 1290, Christian England kept her doors sealed against them till the middle of the 17th century, when the power of the Church had been considerably modified. This exclusiveness and aggressiveness does not exist in spite of the teaching of the Christian

scriptures and Christian dogma. It exists *because* of such teaching. The religion of the jealous God is necessarily the religion of the unfriendly and aggressive god, and, therefore, of the jealous, unfriendly and aggressive man. The greater part of Christian scriptures, both of the Old and of the New Testament, is exclusive. The god of the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms is a warlike, tribal, exclusive, aggressive god. Swords shall be beaten into ploughshares only when, Israel having become supreme, the Pax Judaica can be established. The Christian community is different. It is a community determined not in terms of race or tribe but in terms of creed or faith. Yet it is no less closed. The teaching of St. Paul is exclusive. Even the literature of love, the Johannine literature, preaches a love only of the brethren. It teaches that a man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends, whereas the Jesus of *The Sermon on the Mount* teaches precisely the opposite: "If you love only those who love you, what reward do you get for that? Don't the very taxgatherers do as much? And if you salute your friends, what is special about that? Don't the very pagans do as much? I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in heaven, who makes His sun rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and the unjust."

In some of the teaching of Jesus, mostly in the tradition according to St. Luke, we get an unqualified *inclusiveness*. There we have the gospel of inclusive love, of tolerance, of forgiveness, and of reconciliation. But it is pathetic how those who desire the civilised virtues of freedom, tolerance, reconciliation and sweet reasonableness, look so often in vain to the Christian church for support. The inclusive ethic of the Jesus of the Third Gospel has not yet been accepted by the Christian community, although isolated individuals or groups of individuals within that community assent to it.

What I have tried to say is that, to at least an appreciable extent, historic Christianity has been an anti-social evil. Its record shows irrefutably that it is no more incapable of evil than is any other religion. There is something anti-social in the foundation records of Christianity, even if not in the founder himself. But merely to discard Christianity would not avail us any good. Atheism, agnosticism, Russian communism—those systems so often seem to have discarded the right and retained the wrong things. They have discarded Jesus' conception of a Father-God of all mankind and retained so often the exclusiveness and the aggressive assurance of traditional Christianity.

It may be that Christianity is once more ripe for reformation. Edith Cavell said "Patriotism is not enough." Perhaps to that must be added: "Christianity is not enough." If our world demands an international outlook, it certainly needs an inter-religious one.

Religion in Higher Education

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS, PH.D.

LIBERAL religion respects and supports the purposes of higher education. What are these purposes? Higher education is committed to free inquiry, to the critical temper, to the pursuit of truth whithersoever it may lead. It aims to provide the knowledge, trained intelligence and sensitivity required for full, meaningful participation in those cultural activities that go under the name of "civilization." It aims to elicit the moral integrity and courage indispensable for responsible, noble living in a democracy. When fulfilled, these purposes issue in adherence to "a clear-headed world-outlook." Liberal religion views these purposes not only as compatible with but also as central to the purposes of religion. Consequently, religious liberals believe that religion should be a subject of inquiry and instruction in the university. But there are other kinds of religion besides liberal religion. The religion entertained by perhaps the majority of people is authoritarian and is not directly compatible with the methods of higher education. It is, therefore, understandable that higher education in many places has excluded from the curriculum any systematic inquiry into the nature of religion and into the rôle of religion in culture. On the one hand, many educators in face of authoritarian religion have adopted an attitude of hostility or indifference to the presentation of religion in higher education. Some have assumed that religion must by its nature be authoritarian; others have assumed that it is only an optional aspect of human existence and that it has no necessary place in higher education; and still others have assumed that it is of no positive significance anyway and should be left to the churches. On the other hand, the authoritarian in religion, recognizing the incompatibility between his religion and the aims of higher education, has proscribed the study of religion under the auspices of public higher education; or he has demanded that his religion shall be presented in the university and yet be exempted from the types of investigation characteristic of higher education. Without sharing its cynicism he at times seems to adopt the sentiment of Thomas Hobbes that "It is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure, but chewed are for the most part cast up again without effect."

I have at the outset brought to the fore these awkward, controversial issues, not only because I want to make it clear that liberal religion

insists that the purposes and methods of higher education must be protected against the encroachment of authoritarian religion (or of any other sort of authoritarianism), but also because, in the teeth of precisely the problems I have mentioned, higher education can perform an extremely significant role, a role of positive value not only for the religious liberals and the authoritarians, but also for the people who are called secularists. The definition of this role depends largely upon our conception of the relation between religion and culture.

In approaching the problem of presenting religion in public higher education, we should be on our guard against two errors that one may entertain with regard to the way religion functions in culture. The first error is to suppose that the elements of any religious tradition are so closely bound together that they must function as a unit. To be sure, all of the more important ingredients of a given religion will tend to exercise an influence together. But these ingredients also exert varying degrees of influence. For example, the method of determining truth in a given religion may wield an influence readily distinguishable from that of the content of the religion, though method and content tend in general to depend upon each other. The fact that one finds the principle of authority in a particular type of religion distasteful, should not prevent one from discovering profound values in that religion, values that may be appreciated apart from the principle of authority. It is therefore an error to think that the claims of infallibility made by some groups render all the other aspects of their religion unworthy of the attention of higher education. In this judgment the liberal differs radically from the authoritarian. Whereas an authoritarian will generally deny religious value to liberalism, the religious liberal holds that, despite authoritarianism, tradition religion has made and still makes profoundly significant positive contribution to the culture. Some aspects of the religious liberal's positive appreciation of traditional religion will become evident in our consideration of the second of the two errors.

The second error is the notion that religion is simply one element alongside other elements of the culture. This view overlooks the fact that certain fundamental aspects of any culture are bound to be religious in origin or character. The ethos of any culture—its basic patterns of value-orientation—is decisively conditioned by the religious outlooks of that culture. In the history of Western culture both Judaism and Christianity have provided such fundamental value-orientations. These attitudes are not accidental features of the culture; they are essential elements that affect all other attitudes. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the significance of these religious contributions to the ethos of Western civilization.

Two of the central ideas of both Judaism and Christianity are the doctrines of creation and the belief in one God. It is true that certain

earlier formulations of these doctrines are no longer acceptable. Nevertheless, the implications of these doctrines, their cultural precipitates, so to speak, are still decisive and characteristic for the culture in general as well as for religion. As we shall see, these cultural precipitates may continue to be influential even in a culture where the original "myths" have lost much of their power.

The doctrine of creation finds its early mythological form in the first chapters of *Genesis*. To many minds this biblical account is a creation-myth asserting only that at a given moment a divine being created the cosmos out of nothing, a myth whose significance disappears with the advent of modern scientific cosmology. But the cultural and religious implications of the doctrine of creation are completely missed in such a simple interpretation. Obviously, one must penetrate beneath the primordial mythological formulations of the doctrine if one is to grasp its full significance. One of the most significant aspects of the doctrine is suggested by the words that are repeated in the biblical creation story: "And God saw that it was good." In effect, the doctrine that God created the world means that the finite order as such is to be considered good; it is not to be feared, eschewed, or suppressed; it is not the enemy of meaning. This idea was long ago translated into philosophical terms, to read: *Esse qua esse est bonum*. (Being as such is essentially good). The material order is not ultimately under the control of demonic forces; it is the medium of meaning. St. Paul stresses this idea in theological terms when he writes: "Everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving." St. Augustine appeals to this Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation when he asserts that the doctrine of the Incarnation rejects the Gnostic view that flesh as such is evil; if it were evil, he says, God could not become manifest in the flesh. We see, then, that neither classical Judaism nor classical Christianity is ascetic. In biblical thinking, the fulfilment of human existence does not demand a turning away from the material order; salvation requires not the rejection of the finite for the sake of the infinite, but rather the opening of the finite to the infinite. This positive attitude toward the material order has had a profound effect upon the Western evaluation of early life as such and also upon the conception of the good society as one in which men cherish and share the God-given natural and spiritual resources. Archbishop Temple had these implications of the doctrine of creation in mind when he said that Judaism and Christianity are the most materialistic religions in history. As we shall observe presently, this "materialism" has become an integral part of the ethos of Western Culture.

The belief in one God—monotheism—is of equal significance for the determination of the ethos of the West. Monotheism, in effect, asserts that there is a unity that pervades existence; that is, dependable order

prevails in both the material and spiritual realm. The rejection of a plurality of gods carries also the implication that ethical principles, to be sound, must be universal. To deny this is to reject ethics as such, it is to identify the good with interest, it is to fall back into tribalism. Monotheism in its prophetic form asserts that the divine may not properly be identified with anything partial, with any finite entity. Absolute devotion to any finite entity, be it race, nation, book or church, is excluded in principle; it is idolatry. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." In monotheism appears the principle which again and again has served as the basis for prophetic criticism against these idolatries, whether they be secular or "religious." Thus both religious and secular culture stand always under the judgment of prophetic religion.

This sort of interpretation of the significance of these doctrines of creation and of monotheism has not been devised to "save" the doctrines from the ravages of science and modernity. It is rather the type of interpretation which has resulted (at least partially) from contemporary scientific attempts of myth research and ethos research, attempts that aim to discern the deepest roots of culture and to illuminate the fundamental cultural significance of the "myths" characteristic of a given tradition. The same method has been applied to other doctrines not only in Western but also in Oriental and in primitive culture.

From what has been said of the doctrines of creation and monotheism it becomes clear that they are by no means accidental or peripheral aspects of the Western outlook. They are essential presuppositions that affect the entire Western ethos, in many ways radically distinguishing it from that of the Orient as well as from certain strains in ancient Greek thought. (Numerous other examples of the decisive character of religious contributions to our cultural heritage could, of course, be given. We think, for example, of the idea of the dignity of the individual, of the interpretation of the nature of man, and of Judeo-Christian conceptions of history). The influence of these essential, characteristic ingredients of the ethos reaches far beyond the sphere of explicit religion. Modern science, for example, could not have developed apart from the fertile soil prepared by the doctrines of creation and monotheism. It is no accident that science has appeared in the West and not in the East. We see, then, how pervasive these ancient religious affirmations are in our culture. The typical man of the West to-day, whether he is religious or anti-religious in outlook, accepts some of the fundamental implications of the doctrines of creation and of monotheism. Even much of our secularism is in this respect a Judeo-Christian secularism; it does not completely reject these Judeo-Christian presuppositions.

Religion is not then simply one element alongside others in a culture; through its basic value-orientations it fundamentally conditions the ethos of the culture. Moreover, value-judgments of the sort we have been

discussing here have no inextricable connection with authoritarianism in religion. Authoritarianism may come and go; the attitude towards the world which is implicit, for example, in the doctrine of creation may remain.

In the light of these observations, it is difficult to see how higher education can pursue its own proper aims without giving systematic attention to religion. Properly understood, public higher education would seem to have the responsibility of making explicit the basic presuppositions of our culture and of other cultures. This task has nothing directly to do with denominational or sectarian biases or with apologetics. It is concerned rather with bringing to light the major nerve-paths of our civilization. If the exclusion of religion from public higher education means the exclusion of concern for the fundamental motifs and presuppositions of our religious and cultural tradition, the consequence can only be an egregious ignorance.

But it is not only in these areas that a knowledge and appreciation of religion is required if higher education is to fulfil its purposes. The great literature and art of any culture cannot be understood if the religious dimension is not taken into account. Here again the religious element is not merely one element alongside others; it is decisive and pervasive. One simply does not know Sophocles, Dante, Palestrina, Milton, Bach, Michelangelo, unless he understands their religious orientation and the religious soil out of which their creations came to birth. These men and their like are probably much more influential in shaping the mind and the sensibility of a culture than are the theologians and philosophers. Higher education that fails to give attention to these men as religious leaders and to elicit sympathetic understanding is not yet higher education. It is a form of "the treason of the intellectuals." It is a way of organizing and disseminating ignorance.

We could go on, of course, to other areas and make essentially the same point; for example, to the area of economic and political thought and action, to education, to the realm of biography. But two very important considerations implicit in our discussion so far, should be given further emphasis.

First, the demanded concern for religion in public higher education is not merely an academic matter. It is not merely a concern that knowledge about religion shall be in widest commonalty spread. The high function of education is to produce a leadership and a citizenry that can take up the tasks of public as well as private life. Higher education should elicit in the student intelligent and enduring enthusiasms, a concern for just and meaningful human community, a responsible adherence to a world outlook. In this respect my own generation of graduates from college has been tried and found wanting to a surprising degree, if we are to credit a sociological survey that has been made on the subject.

A few years ago Dr. C. Robert Pace made a study of the graduates of a Midwestern State University. In his book *They went to College* (University of Minnesota Press, 1941) we learn some disconcerting facts about 951 students and graduates from the classes that entered in the years 1925, 1928, and 1929. We learn the shocking facts that only 3% of these people read significant magazines and books, and that in the fateful years before the outbreak of the Second World War more of them confessed interest in the comic strips than in the foreign news. Most of their activities are described as passive and uncreative. Less than 25% of them actively participate in the function of citizenship. They even show little concern with economic or governmental developments that affect their own jobs or livelihood. By and large, they fail to appreciate or understand the relationships between contemporary problems or the integrated nature of modern society. The real interest of the majority, says Dr. Pace, is complacent under-middle-class living; their greatest satisfactions in life are found in security, in their families, and in their jobs. Reflecting upon the dismal reports of Dr. Pace, one is forced to see something typical in the personal confession of an eminent American literary critic: "My code of life and conduct is this: work hard, play to the allowable limit . . . never do a friend a dirty trick . . . never grow indignant over anything, trust to tobacco for calm and serenity, bathe twice a day . . . never allow oneself even a passing thought of death." There is something approximating the character of a vacuum in that kind of world outlook. Neither higher education nor democracy can live from so puny a faith. This brings me to the second point.

The need for the presentation of religion in higher education is not properly understood if one supposes it is met by a survey of the merely external phenomena or of the ideas appearing in religious history and the common life. Familiarity with the external manifestations of culture and religion does not fill the sort of vacuum I have just referred to or give zest and direction to life. Within and underneath all these manifestations there works a power and spirit, the source of life and value and meaning. Devotion to the working of this power and spirit produces the cultural creations that constitute the general subject matter of higher education. But devotion to these cultural creations is not religion; this sort of devotion is devotion to the creatures and not to the creator. Religion is devotion to the source of meaning and value, the source of meaningful existence. If higher education is to investigate and present religion, it will then have to deal with the question concerning the nature of the power and spirit that creates meaningful existence. Here again, it will encounter resistance at the hands of certain religious groups.

From the point of view of liberal religion, however, higher education has the obligation to investigate the character of the power and spirit upon which cultural creations depend. In conducting this investiga-

tion, it can make a contribution to religion itself. Religion like everything else needs to be brought and kept under judgment; this means that the object to which religion gives its devotion must be brought under scrutiny. The unexamined religion is not worth having. Religion in all its reaches needs the assistance, the free inquiry, of higher education; it needs to learn to look for truth more than for the comforts of security; it needs to be encouraged to look for truth on the basis of evidence; it needs to overcome its fear that free inquiry will destroy religion; it needs to take the risk of investigation, in the faith that truth will heal the wounds it makes. Ultimately, these demands upon religion are not the demands of higher education; they are the demands of the object worthy of devotion. They are the "reasonable service" required of both religion and higher education. God, the source of value and meaning, demands more, but also he demands nothing less, than the critical temper, the reverence for evidence, that belong to higher education. Without these disciplines, our worship must become merely a projection of our own fixations.

These things cannot be attempted in a fit of absence of mind. They demand systematic attention. This systematic attention is all the more needed in a time when many of our youth depend upon higher education rather than upon the churches for the achievement of the critical temper, and in a time when adolescent desire for independence from parental authority and from parent-symbols attempts to suppress an interest in the religious heritage and in the ultimate trustworthy object, man's devotion.

Where the very meaning of life is at stake, as it is here, pure objectivity is, of course, not possible. Probably it is not desirable, certainly not if it means mere neutrality. The successful teacher is a man with a developed point of view about the meaning of human existence. He possesses a vision of greatness, and his teaching is informed and directed by commitment to that vision. But this commitment must not carry with it the assumption that it possesses a monopoly on the vision of greatness. There is no place in higher education for the person who claims to possess a monopoly. If religion is to be presented in the university, men of conviction and *tolerance* will be required as in the rest of the university, a combination that the convinced authoritarian despises.

In any event, risks must be taken in this whole venture of presenting religion in public higher education, the risk, for example, that a teacher will be so neutral and so lacking in passion that he prefers the area of the irrelevant, or the risk that a teacher will be so much of an evangelist that he requires the explicit criticism of colleagues and students—a criticism that is available at the hands of higher education wherever it is worthy of the name. Anyone who does not believe in taking such risks does not believe in higher education. In face of these risks, however, no public institution of higher learning can properly permit among its

teachers anyone who in the classroom functions as a propagandist (recognized or unrecognized) for any special-interest group, whether it be the American Legion, the Communist Party, the National Association of Manufacturers, the C.I.O., or a religious group. If any one of these (or a similar group) is to be permitted a stated representative on the teaching staff of the university, there is no good reason why representatives for all of these groups should not be given the same privilege. What a preposterous situation that would be! This does not mean that the claims of such groups should not receive consideration; but it does mean that they should be granted no special privileges. If they are permitted to be exempt from criticism, higher education and academic freedom will be compromised. On the other hand, if their presuppositions and purposes are not taken honestly and seriously into account, higher education evades its responsibility.

With respect to authoritarian religious groups, the situation would be less complicated if there were only one religion or denomination claiming absolute authority. But there are many groups that make absolutist claims for their religion and that fear to permit the spirit to blow where it listeth. The demands of these groups that their claims shall be simultaneously presented as a part of public higher education amount to the demand that the university shall provide an arena where many "infallible" voices may be heard and where their competing claims shall be exempt from the kind of free inquiry to which higher education is committed.

From the point of view of liberal religion, as well as from that of public higher education, this approach to the problem of presenting religion in the university should be excluded on principle. This means, specifically, that the policy of giving university credit to a student for subjecting himself to the disciplines of authoritarianism must be rejected. Such a policy should be viewed with fear, for as the Roman Catholic Charles Péguy has observed, "Tyranny is always better organized than liberty." The proponent of any such policy will find it extremely difficult to defend in the name of public higher education the crimes against intellectual conscience which have been committed by representatives of authoritarianism in the courses on religion in some of our colleges and universities. On the other hand, to be sure, an insidious kind of tyranny is exercised by public higher education when it excludes religion from systematic consideration in the university.

It may be seriously questioned whether any kind of religion, authoritarian or non-authoritarian, stands to gain anything by partisan competition under the auspices of public higher education. A certain type of religious leader to-day makes the charge that cynicism and relativism are destroying seriousness of purpose and adherence to civilised standards; they even charge that relativism is the characteristic vice of secularism. But, actually, the arrogant bluffing exhibited by the com-

peting proponents of absolutist religions creates probably as much cynicism and relativism as does so-called secularism. Indeed, bluff in the name of God and in the name of "humility," bluff dressed in ecclesiastical garb, bluff promoted by merely ecclesiastical machinery, is to-day creating atheism and hostility to religion on a mass-production scale. This bluffing species of religion, with its inevitable internecine battle within the species, cannot in its arbitrariness avoid giving the impression of being merely an expression of the will to power. In the interest of religion itself as well as of higher education, denominational and inter-faith groups should therefore support non-sectarian inquiry into religion in the university.

This proposal that religion be presented in a non-sectarian fashion presupposes a fundamental principle of public higher education; namely, that it is the responsibility of everyone engaged in higher education to apply the methods of responsible, free inquiry in all areas of concern, and also to protect higher education from any threat to these methods. Any failure to meet this responsibility will have as its consequence a situation not easy to distinguish in principle from the sort of perversion of education we have witnessed in our time in both Nazi and Communist "education" and "science." The issues involved here are therefore of world-historical importance; they have to do with what is most precious in life—the freedom of man, and with it the freedom of religion. For this reason, higher education needs religion and religion needs higher education.

Toward the end of protecting this freedom and also of achieving high standards in the presentation of religion in public higher education, the teachers in this field must continue vigorously to develop the professional attitude of the academic man. Here the term "professional attitude" is used in a technical sense. A profession is a calling that has a special task in culture, the task of transmitting, criticizing, and mediating the ethos of the culture in the face of new situations; a profession deals with matters that are subject to rational discipline and public scrutiny; it defines and maintains the standards of the group by means of professional associations; it maintains these standards against "racketeering" pressures, and it improves them in the face of deficiencies within the group itself.

In the spirit and purpose that have been set forth here, religious liberalism holds with Alfred North Whitehead that "The essence of education is that it be religious. Pray, what is religious education? A religious education is an education that inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity."

Beyond Egoism and Altruism

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THE question of human relations as personal inter-relationships has waited, since early Christian times, almost until our own day to be given serious thought. Even Sociology, first conceived by Comte in the nineteenth century as the science of social relations, as well as "Social Psychology" from Hobbes to McDougall, reveals little concern for the need of human beings for personal relationships. We must therefore, clearly distinguish between social relations and personal relationships—the terms are by no means synonymous or mutually inclusive.

Had not psychology been quickened from its former sterility there would be no other system of thought interested in this central problem. Even as things are, some of the most influential psychologists, professing to expound the psychology of Personality, evade the issue, and prefer mental states, processes, structure, traits and habits, the "collective unconscious" and so on, to what is becoming more and more obviously the central human problem. Even books on psychology as applied to social problems narrow their consideration to such matters as mental deficiency and delinquency, and only as these concern society at large. Fortunately, since the second World War, steps have been taken both in this country and in the U.S.A. to make up for this lack.

In Philosophy, not until Ludwig Feuerbach (about whose works social philosophers maintain a strange silence) is there any real concern with the socio-personal situation as such, and even he deserts it at last, for subjectivism. The sociological movement from Hobbes to our own time has been more interested in the relations between the individual and society as abstractions than in person-to-person relationships. The problems of political authority loom large. The shuttle-cock is tossed between an emphasis upon individuality and the autonomous self on the one hand, and the State or Society on the other; or between the Hobbists' tenebrous account of human nature and the romanticism of Rousseau.

Moral Philosophy presents us with three general theories of the moral ideal: Egoism, Altruism, and Universalism, the last of which claims to unite what truth there is in the two former. Writers like Bradley and Benjamin Kidd, however, see no possibility of such reconciliation. There is no solution for this problem as conceived by Moral Philosophy. Indeed, the dialectic itself is artificial, for there are no such things as the Ego on the one hand and the Alter on the other: there is only the living human situation of personal interaction. It is with

this human problem that we are here concerned. Accepting as a precedent the terms *Egoism* and *Tuism*, we list four groups of social theories thus :

1. EGOISM ; the "I" group.
2. IDISM ; the "It" group (both vowels are short).
3. TUISM ; the "Thou" group.
4. EGOTUISM ; the "I-Thou" group.

EGOISM.

This group includes the psychological Egoism of Hobbes, the Egoistic Absolutism of Max Stirner, the Individualism of the Nineteenth Century, the Anarchism of Bakunin and Kropotkin, all of which have, in common, the centrality of the individual self and the insistence that society must serve the ends of the self rather than that the individual must serve society. The term "Psychological Egoism," associated with "Psychological Hedonism," describes this view of man's nature. From the ethical side we have the view that the individual's duty is to seek his own perfection.

Here, however we have to distinguish between *egoity* and *egoism*, and also between *egoism* and *egotism*. Whilst we have to recognize man's egoity, by which is meant his self-feeling or feeling of individual identity, the egoism proclaimed by Stirner as well as its expression in Individualism is, from our point of view, an intellectual form of neurotic rationalization, whilst egotism is a psychopathological condition in which the individual strives for his own self-realization by focussing his whole life-energy or libido upon himself. It is his frustrated egoity exaggerating itself, as all balked natural satisfactions do. Stirner, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard translate into the diction of philosophy some of the characteristic idioms of neurosis. Man's socio-personal nature is irrelevant to all doctrines of this order. It is essential to the theory that we present in this article, that ego-centricity, however, rationalized, is the chief characteristic of neurosis and that it is frustration-behaviour relative to the basic need of man as personality. We shall discuss subsequently what we believe this basic need to be.

One of the most convincing contemporary exponents of the centrality of the individual is Erich Fromm who sees neurotic behaviour as conditioned by 'the disharmony of man's existence' and the baulking of the needs generated by such disharmony. He speaks of the 'need for completeness in the process of living,' and for 'unity and equilibrium between the individual and the rest of nature' which has been lost. Thus he explains the systems of thought by which man seeks an answer to the questions regarding his status, security, and duty. Man strives to resolve the factual, existential and conditioned dichotomy. Against authoritarian ethics he pleads for a "humanistic" ethics based upon psychological understanding of man's nature, which sees "virtue" as

the realization of man's specific qualities, and, in the individual, of his own individuality. Critical as he is of subjectivism, and desirous of distinguishing between the actualization of the self and the centralization of the ego, Fromm's ethics is overweighted on the side of the ego. It is true that he believes it to be one of the characteristics of human nature to find fulfilment only in relatedness to his fellow men, but he thinks that love of one's neighbour radiates from man, it is 'his own power by which he relates himself to the world and makes it truly his.'

Fromm's use of the term 'man' suffers from ambiguity both in the title of his book *Man for Himself*, and throughout the text. When he may be taken to mean Man in general or humanity, the human race, he is the prophet of Humanism which allows for nothing which transcends man, and permits no ethical authority but that of his own conscience. That is to say, human nature or 'Man' is endowed with an inner voice, and this voice is 'our own voice,' so that it is not only generic and hereditary, but also the possession of each individual. This raises some fundamental problems which are left in the air, and which his ambiguous use of the term 'man' makes all the more difficult. This conscience, however, is not to be confused with the Freudian internalized authority of the 'super-ego,' a conscience whose prescriptions are 'not determined by one's own value judgment', but which arises from the realised potency of love, reason and creativity in ourselves and in others. 'Conscience, Man's Recall to Himself,' which is one of Fromm's section captions, indicates the self-reference of his ethics. His analysis of the authoritarian conscience, especially in theology, is, without doubt, of considerable importance. He sees this as the determinant of sadism and destructiveness, especially against the person's own self. This is what Freud reveals, and it demonstrates the 'correctness of Nietzsche's thesis that the blockage of freedom turns man's instincts 'backwards against himself.' Fromm's own earlier work, *The Fear of (or Escape from) Freedom* treats more fully of this theme.

His aversion from authoritarianism we completely share, and that, on psychological grounds; its consequences in personal suffering can be fully documented from our own work with religious people whose nerve has failed them. The authoritarian attitude is still powerful in religious circles, as is manifest in the works of Mr. C. S. Lewis, in one of which he goes to the extent of demanding that the child's will should be broken. The same doctrine we heard expounded by a Roman Catholic priest at a recent conference on Problem Families (October, 1949). He attributed the existence of such families to the lack of authoritarian discipline, which is the rôle of the father. This priest depicted the family as necessarily an authoritarian institution in which children must be dealt with as members of a military organization. When Fromm shows the psycho-

pathological consequences of this attitude towards the individual and society, he confirms what every worker in this field fully realizes. Though, when he says that "the scars left from the child's defeat in the fight against irrational authority are to be found at the bottom of every neurosis," he makes, perhaps, too sweeping a statement.

Against the authoritarian conscience, Fromm opposes the 'humanistic conscience' which is 'our own voice, present in every human being and independent of external sanctions and rewards.' It is a 'reaction of ourselves to ourselves,' the voice of a man's own true self which calls him to return to himself, to live productively and to develop fully and harmoniously; that is, 'to become what we potentially are.' It is 'the voice of our loving care for ourselves;' the 'expression of man's self-interest and integrity, while authoritarian conscience is concerned with man's obedience, self-sacrifice, duty, or his social adjustment.'

Hence, not only is Fromm's 'Man' the generalized human being, but very definitely and concretely the individual human being. This is egoistic ethics, as propounded by Max Stirner: it is centred in the individual himself. In his revolt against Hitlerism and the Hitlerite regime in his own native land, Fromm reveals his own personal suffering as well as his own personally achieved solution. He turns to himself; exalts his own individual personality and fights for man's freedom from all that threatens it *in himself*. But the logic of his solution brings us back to the same point as the one from which he flees, for totalitarianism is egoism writ large. Behind authoritarianism lies ego-engrossment; behind ego-engrossment lies frustration of a person's basic need as a person. Egoity frustrated, is perverted into egotism, and men's love for themselves becomes but the obverse of their hatred of all who do not serve their ends and feed their insatiable egotism.

We do not argue against the need for self-actualization or completeness. Indeed, this is as important to the present thesis as it is to Fromm's. What seems to be unsatisfactory is the one-sidedness of its argument. Suffering from the weakness of Humanism, its focus is anthropocentric, and ego-centric. We find fault with his plea that it is only by the experience and fulfilment of his uniqueness that the individual person achieves unity, equilibrium, and completeness, that to be human is to use one's powers for oneself, and not for any power transcending man, that it is no use looking for ideals, solutions and answers anywhere else except in man himself. Surely it is not sufficient that man should have the courage to *be himself*—with that we eagerly agree—but Fromm's last words in this book are these: ". . . courage to be himself and to be *for himself*" (our italics). It is upon this preposition that his ethics breaks. It brings us to Stirner's philosophy of uniqueness, and to Kierkegaard's "Single One." Uniqueness to Stirner is a purely subjective state: he declares that he loves men because loving them makes *him* feel happy,

not because he is commanded to love: it is his own individual fellow-feeling. When he kisses away the troubled crease from his beloved's forehead, it is only his own trouble that he is kissing away. Human relations are made up out of the *usableness*, the utility of each to the other. And it is what I judge to be useful to me in the other person that makes him of value: it is a subjective evaluation. He has no value in himself to me, but he has value in himself to himself, just as I have to myself. This is pure Stirnerism; but it is also the philosophy of *Man for Himself*.

The chief importance of Stirner to us is not that he propounded a new philosophy, but that he has presented us with so frank and naive an exposition of a very old one; he has literally exposed Egoistic Ethics in its nakedness. He gives us no evasions, no excuses, no whittling down: it is an exposition and not an apologia. It is egoism pure and simple in its stark boldness and its uninhibited anti-pietism, anti-*l'étatisme*, anti-socialism, and anti-everything but the one, yet multitudinous, pivot of the universe, the one ego of each individual. It is the centrality of the "I" and of every several "I".

The modern recrudescence of egoism is an expression of revolt—there is obvious rebellion in it; it is polemical, an attack upon authority in some form or another, upon herd psychology and the social cohesion which is coagulation. It is the philosophy required by those who have been dwarfed by the colossus of some organization, the State, or the Church, or the universe itself, and by early deprivations of a socio-personal nature.

There is something pathological in the rebellious disposition of Stirner, Nietzsche, and Byron. Of Stirner's life we are unable to speak, but Byron and Nietzsche's stories are well enough known. Bertrand Russell's* brilliant portrayal of socio-psychological determinants of Byron's Titanism is, in general, typical of the romantic rebel and the egoistic fighter for freedom. Freedom to him is freedom to dominate, or freedom from social conventions and restraints; and egoism is the fortress in which the over-sensitive soul immures himself and finds security, and in which he is imprisoned. Egoism, therefore, ends for the individual in self-destruction, and for society in chaos. But it is important that it should be seen as Russell sees it in his account of Byron, and as the modern explorer of personality sees it, as an expression, albeit pathological, of an inherent need to be personally fulfilled, complete. It is the need for self-actualization seeking satisfaction in either what appears to be the only way that life has left for it, or what appears to be the most economical way. Thus do men deify themselves, creating for themselves what Adler describes as the "goal of godlikeness" and even, as with Nietzsche, the

* Bertrand Russell: "*History of Western Philosophy*." London, 1946. pp. 774-7.

rank of God. This neurotic goal not only 'transforms the relation of the individual to his environment into hostility,' to use Adler's words, but it is the individual's subjective refuge from a hostile environment, that is, from conditions of life that deprive him of the realization of his specific qualities. The so-called will to power is but the normal and natural human need for personal affirmation, blown-up to such a disproportionate magnitude as to make unity and equilibrium impossible. It is a psychic gigantism like the abnormal physical overgrowth due to pituitary disease. The abnormal overgrowth of the ego is subjective, and reveals that 'mistaken focus of attention' which is 'typical of neurosis in general'—the focus upon one's self.

Under the stress of fundamental and persistent frustration, the need for individual status and self-security asserts itself in some such conditioned form or another. Not least among these forms are the intellectual systems of thought and religious myths which relieve the individual of his intolerable sense of unwantedness or futility. Instead of creatively changing his environment, for which he has no courage, he either sets himself above it in an Elysium of godlike superiority, or retires from it into the recesses of his own self-created ivory tower. He is still creative, and often with great ingenuity and ability, but, like the creativity which is expended on atomic bombs, he creates for his own destruction the very destiny he fears most and seeks so strenuously to escape. Not only is he mistaken in his focus of attention, but he is still more gravely mistaken in his understanding of what is his real and central need. This is the mistake of the great propounders of Egoism, who cry for the realization of the unique ego. The unique ego can never be realized as a unique ego. Man's most characteristic need is neither for individuality nor for sociality in itself, but for both as a single, basic need. Man's characteristic need is not a mere subjective desire seeking a subjective satisfaction. It is not an arbitrary like or dislike. It is the psychic meeting-place of the self and its personal world; it is an orientation too, a goal-seeking impulsion which is as much goal-determined as it is self-derived. It is the answer of the soul to the call of life as well as the soul calling to life and its laws by which it is actualized. The fact that the progress is that of self-realization does not mean that it is centred in the ego or individual. Rather it is centred in the person-with-person situation. To develop as a person is the only means of developing as an individual and not vice versa.

IDISM.

The term ID as used by Freud represents his notion of the non-ego part of the mind, the *non-personal*. Martin Buber has given us the "I-IT" combination as distinct from that of the "I-THOU"; and the realm of the IT is that which the "I" perceives, senses, imagines, feels, wills and thinks; but it is not the realm of the "I" or of the "THOU."

In our use of this neologism IDISM we have in mind the social, political or religious theories in which the individual human being is conceived as related to and transcended by a thing, and, indeed, dominated by it, be it State, Society, the Church or the Family as an institution, an IT, and that this IT is primary, central and paramount. Such are the State Absolutism of the Hegelians, the Theocracy of Calvin, the Collectivism of Comte, the Organicism of Spencer (despite his revolt against State Absolutism), the Universalism of the Unitarians, the Communism of Marx, and all totalitarian ideology or ecclesiology. It is not only that in these systems the individual tends to be devaluated, but that the only basis of human relations in the person-with-person situation is ignored.

The systems of thought that conceive of Society or State as a personality only succeed in making it into a thing and in reducing personality in the individual into another thing. The situation thus descends into that of one thing over against another thing. Once we individualize in this way we reify, for to be an individual, pure and simple, is to be a thing. Relations thus become merely relations of purely differentiated entities and not of persons, and even the creative and significant differences between persons are lost. Indeed, the individual person himself is forfeited. Things only are pure individuals. Such a world is unnatural to man as person; the only real world for him is the world in which personality is fulfilled, and that is the world of persons and therefore of personal relationships. Man's fulfilment is found not in living for the sake of an institution, whether it be State, Society, Family, Church, Trade Union, or any other, but for the sake of personal relationships. And it is only as these institutions serve this end that they have any value for human beings as persons, as distinct from citizens or sexual mates, reproducers of their kind, communicants, and so on. The organizing of persons for the sake of the thing is, perhaps, one of the greatest errors of history, from Plato down to this day, and no profounder piece of social wisdom can be found in Social Philosophy than this: "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." The Sabbath, however sacred, is but an institution, a thing, an IT. To centralize an IT and to subordinate men and women to IT, is to dehumanize and so degrade them. It is the subtlest and most common form of human degradation. That it should be done in the name of the highest, exposes its hostility to personality, its treachery to man, only more nakedly. Man needs the institution; he cannot maintain his life as a social being without the organization provided by it, but the error of Hobbes is not that he insisted that men need institutions in which authority is vested, but that men must have order and peace imposed upon them by some external sovereign power, to which (or to whom) they hand over their individual rights, and so nullify their innate egotism. The sum total of human relations thus

become the dominance of many small ITS by one very big IT. Even though this authority be a human monarch, the relation is not that of persons: he becomes a mere thing, an institution, a status. What we have is the organization and mechanization of individuals and not their integration as persons. Individuals may even thus be associated in a common purpose, but it is a common purpose of separate individuals and not a communion of persons. Society as an IT is not society as communion: these are totally different forms of association. In the former the individual remains an individual as a separate entity, but even so he loses his individuality or distinctiveness, his individual integrity; in the latter his individuality is honoured and differences between individuals are integrated. In the idistic machine individualness remains while individuality is sacrificed. The modern rise of Egoism (as distinct from Individualism) is a revolt against Idism, for Idism reduces the relation of individual to State, Society or Church, to that of one thing to another, the evil of such a relation being the humiliation or degradation of the self. Such a relation is not of persons; it is not human relations at all.

Idism not only repudiates personality, it violates it. For Idism the person counts only as he is instrumental, which not only makes him no person at all, but robs the human being of his one inviolable quality, his integrity as a person. And to be a person is not merely to be an individual, but to be inter-related with other human beings in freedom and equality.* Human relationships are personal, and belong to the realm of creative experience and growth. Idism, resulting in the displacement of man, leads to conflict. Not only is there conflict between the claims of personal integrity and the demands of the institution, whatever form of Idism it may be, but there is conflict between one form of Idism and another. It results thus in inner conflict for the individual, and in internecine conflict between individuals themselves. Our devotion to an idea of society as a system, institution or organization, brings us into conflict with others whose devotion is to some other idea. We fight for our ideas, while the person is thrown out, and, even in the flesh, eliminated. Thus ideas become things; an idea becomes an ID, petrified into a creed, a dogma, a doctrine, a sacred formula, an ideology. In religion, Faith itself is subverted: man becomes incorporated into the system; orthodoxy is paramount, and the person, instead of being "saved" by his faith is lost in a system of absolute "beliefs". Religion thus is prostituted into a system of IDS, and the relation of the individual to his religion becomes one of subordination to an organization called the Church. The way of Idism, howsoever holy its professions, is the way of human disintegration or infantilism. The organization of human life can be justified only as it makes creative personal inter-relationships possible. Otherwise it is only a concatenation of things—a mere congeries.

* Cf. John MacMurray, *"Reason and Emotion."* p. 93ff.

Before we come to consider the theory which is described by the term TUISM, we should give some reason for placing ALTRUISM in the category of IDISM rather than in the present one. The social ideal of Altruism is that which claims the individual in the service of the "other," the *alter*, to the neglect of one's self. The worth of the individual is found only in his absorption in some collectivity like the Family, the Fatherland or "Humanity." Altruism, though introducing the "other," extols institutional cohesion rather than inter-personal mutuality, and thus remains an Idism. It exalts the worth of the Idea of Humanity above that of the human being as personality.

Comte, who gave us the term and the ideal, saw man's essential distinction in his social nature, and the core of his doctrine is in his "new" science of "Sociology." Our task, according to him, is to know the laws of humanity, the knowledge of which is the consummation of all science. He opposes Altruism to Egoism on this basis—the basis of the "actual" nature of Humanity—all egoistic desires must be eradicated, and selfless devotion to society or mankind, take its place. The individual has no rights but only duties, of which love of neighbour is the chief. But the problem of human inter-personal relationships has no place in his scheme: Comte lost personality altogether in the vast inane of what he called "Humanity," the *Grand Etre*. In his humanism we look in vain for the human being, whether he be "I" or "THOU." For nobody can love "Humanity"; we can love only each other as human beings. There is, really, no such reality as family, fatherland, or humanity: there are only human beings, persons, in certain specific situations of relationships with each other.*

Further, when using the Christian injunction to love one's neighbour, Comte plucks it from its context, and not only decapitates it by leaving out the first part which makes the love of God primary, but he amputates it of its nether and locomotive limbs by cutting out the important clause: "as thyself." This Christian triad can hardly be treated thus without making a corpse of it. Its essence is lost, for it has no life and no meaning apart from inter-personal relationships. Comte reduces love of neighbour to service of a certain type of social organization, an ID. No human being can live in such a world, for none can have relationship with a *Grand Etre*. Altruism, therefore, is not to be included under our present heading, despite its emphasis upon "the Other."

In his *History of Modern Materialism*† Lange provides us with a cue when he speaks of the temptation to parallel Comte's ALTRUISM with Feuerbach's TUISM: "Feuerbach always starts from the individual who seeks completion in another, and only comes to act for the whole by

* Cf. J. P. Mayer et al: "Political Thought; The European Tradition."

† Bk. 1 p. 255

personal affection. In Comte society and man's social impulse is the starting point, and his moral law, *vivre pour altrui*, does not flow freely like a passion from the heart, but must be supported by the notion of duty towards society."

With Ludwig Feuerbach we enter a different climate, and experience a crisis in social thinking. The social philosophy of Feuerbach was eudaemonian. He looked for the *psychological* springs of such a characteristic human experience as religion: "All theology is psychology." He searched for the basic human needs which religion satisfies, or professes to satisfy, and which, therefore, explain's man's pre-occupation with it. God corresponds to some human need. In his theory that the fundamental fact about religion is the wish, he anticipated Freud, or may it be truer to say that Freud inherited from Feuerbach his wish-fulfilment psychology by which he professes to explain religion as "nothing but" infant wish-fulfilment? Feuerbach's theory is, however, richer than Freud's, for, whereas, to the former, that which man estimates as of worth is that to which he attributes divinity, to the latter, it is all and nothing but an illusion. There is an axiology of the wish in Feuerbach which is lacking in psycho-analysis. Man's deity is, however, self-created. Since man judges personality, for example, to be the highest value, so he attributes personality to God. Conversely, because he worships God as the God of Love, we may infer that he gives to lovingness the highest place in his system of values. And, just as their pursuit of happiness brings men to religion, so too it involves them in moral relations which are essentially social. Evil is self-exclusiveness, in which there is no happiness.*

Feuerbach compels philosophy to face the fact of man himself as central, with this important qualification, that it is man neither as individual ("for himself") nor as connected with "society," but as man-with-man, a unity for which individuality, however, is basic. In his own words, it is a "unity which rests only on the reality of the difference between I and Thou." When Martin Buber refers to this teaching of Feuerbach, he says: "... in those words Feuerbach . . . introduced that discovery of the *Thou* which has been called the "Copernican revolution" of modern thought, and 'an elemental happening which is just as rich in consequences as the idealistic discovery of the "I" and is bound to lead to a new beginning of European thought'"

Feuerbach led the reaction against the Hegelian absolutism, and saw man as "I and Thou," and his being as contained and fulfilled only in the community, not in Comte's or in Hegel's sense, but in the

* "To treat the actual forms of religion as expressions of our human needs is a fruitful idea which deserves fuller development than it has received, but Feuerbach's treatment of it is fatally vitiated by his subjectivism."
Encyclopedia Britannica.

recognition of the Thou by the I. It is in the unity of differentiated persons that essential human-ness lies, and not in some *grand être*. We meet here, as it appears to us, for the first time in philosophy, the elemental reality of socio-personal relationships. Each individual is confronted with the other and it is this recognition of the other, the TU, that is the primary condition of happiness. Feuerbach's ethics are built on the socio-personal need: "The same elemental want, in myself and in another." Each individual is "balanced or completed" by such a mutual recognition. So Feuerbach presents us with important clues to the solution of our problem, which lead to the notions of socio-personal significance and mutual mediation in a unitary psycho-ethical process.*

Man, as person in his communal inter-relationships, dwells in his own real indigenous world. In his relation to any social organization as such, he dwells in a world which is characterized by artificial economic or political connections. Both these orders belong to the social life of man, of course, and the study of human relationships covers them both. But it is the I-IT context and connection which has engrossed the philosophers generally, even where indications of the I-THOU involvement are not lacking, as in Royce and the English Hegelians. It is, however, more than a matter of emphasis: it is an ancient traditional way of thinking of man and society with the authority of Plato, Aristotle and Western Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, behind it. Catholicism and Calvinism are at one in this. Feuerbach broke away from this powerful I-IT tradition, and confronts us with the socio-personal situation itself.

Unfortunately, Feuerbach failed to take this principle through to its full implication, and, as Lange points out, "relapsed into theoretical Egoism," which influenced Stirner in his Egoistic Absolutism. Though this lapse is a radical weakness in Feuerbach, it is to his credit that he gave a new and significant place for the pronoun of the second person, and for the individual who is to be recognized as the other person; he gave us TUISM.

EGOTUISM.

The kind of situation which is inherently needed by, and is indigenous to, personality, is that in which both the I and the Thou are recognized and realized in the very relationship between the two: it is inter-personal. Nor is it to be taken as "I and Thou", but rather as "I-Thou"; the I-Thouness of the situation is what is central. It is thus a socio-personal situation and relationship—a relationship not of individuals only, as differentiated entities, but of persons, for the person is the human individual as he is capable of integration in the communion of other persons. Such an integration is not a fusion in which identities are lost, but rather the creative event in which personality emerges, develops, and is fulfilled.

* Cp. R. A. Tsanoff, "The Moral Ideals of our Civilization." New York, 1942

Among the best exponents of this orientation in sociological thought are Mary P. Follett (*Creative Society*, *The New State*, and *Dynamic Administration*) and Martin Buber. The former portrays society as the creative situation in which the experience of all is necessary and in which interests are not balanced but integrated. Mutual adjustment is not enough since that achieves only a quantitative balance, whereas by integration a plus situation is achieved—"the increment of unifying". Miss Follett's sociology takes us beyond the sociology of dialectic to that of the creative integration of the I-Thou complementation. Such phrases as "the social interest in the individual" and "the individual interest in the social" must become co-ordinated with each other, so that the integrity of the individual is maintained as it cannot be by mere compromise or balancing of opposing individual interests. The reality of what we here call socio-personal relationships is in the activity between persons, an activity in which persons are mutually creative and created, and thus is society created. It is not that one individual reacts to another individual, but that each reacts in and through the relationship. The Thou reacts not to the I, but to the I-Thou. By the very process of their meeting each becomes something different. Human socio-personal behaviour is thus neither the function of the environment nor of the "organism," but of the relation between them, which is an activity not only embodying but evolving purpose as a continuous process, though not as a dialectic. It is this truth, described by Miss Follett as "the deepest truth of life," that is now known in psychology as the "Circular Response." Behaviour is inter-behaviour between persons, and not the juxtaposition of "individual" and "Society" or "State." If this is so, then here is a major task for psychology—to investigate the conditions that make inter-relationships creative of the basic satisfactions of man's nature. We may well look to this concept for the direction we need in sociology and psychology, for the solution to the "human problem" and for a healing light in the darkness of our modern neurosis of individual and of society. Such a doctrine transcends the socialism of the idealists as well as that of our modern State, which, though with less of the aristocratic emphasis of Plato and Aristotle, insists, as they did, that the interests of the individual self and those of society must be balanced, to end their mutual opposition. It says that the State must attend to interests of the individual, and the individual must submit to the claims of the State. It is on this level alone that human relations have been conceived and planned. This means that the organization must be served by the individual members in order that the individual members may be served by the organization. The trouble lies in the obvious tendency of the organization to take precedence over the individual in such an arrangement. Nothing is more pitifully apparent in the "welfare state" which we are now enjoying than that the effort to balance individual and State is resulting in an

increasing mechanization of human relations, and, therefore, of de-individualization, and, of much more serious import to us, of depersonalization. To plan in this way is to start at the wrong end, for the basis of community is not in individual-state relations, but in person-with-person relationships, in the living, elemental I-Thou situation.

It is this principle that constitutes the theme that runs through the writings of Martin Buber, as expressed in the titles of his best-known books, *I and Thou* and *Between Man and Man*, and in the purpose of his inaugural course of lectures as Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, "that it is by beginning neither with the individual nor with the collectivity, but only with the reality of the mutual relation between man and man, that this essence can be grasped." Buber provides the perfect concrete example of his principle, and, indeed, he feels that it can be conveyed, if at all, only by examples. The story in its barest outline is this: a group of "men from different European peoples" had met in 1914 in an attempt to create a supra-national body. One of them was a clergyman, who protested that too many Jews were being nominated for it. Buber, as a Jew, felt that this was an injustice, and he "protested against the protest." But though neither of them compromised, something happened between them in terms of a person-with-person relationship. The Jew, instead of repudiating the Christian's belief in Jesus, integrated it with his own belief, acknowledged his own "affinity with Jesus." The situation became transformed into a "bond between Christian and Jew. In this transformation dialogue was fulfilled. Opinion was gone, in a bodily way the factual took place." It was not that they had not recognised the factual limitation of each by the other, determined by their conditioned nature, but that, by accepting it, they overcame it together. Neither was it achieved by means of a compromise which required that one or another or both yielded his individual point of view to the other, but that "they had already met one another when each in his soul so turned to the other that from then on, making him present, he spoke really to and towards him." It is only on such a basis as this that any international body can hope to achieve international results of a creative kind. Illustrations of this principle will be only too obvious to the reader, for they abound on all levels of inter-social and international relations. The inter-denominational movement, for example, as expressed in the Oecumenical spirit of modern times, is not due to Churches as institutions holding great councils together in the hope of uniting themselves into a homogeneous whole. It is due to personal relationships between members of these denominations; the creation of a personal between-ness whereby not compromise but integration of heterogeneous opinions or beliefs, is achieved.

Egotism is a fundamentally different conception of human relations from any other described under the foregoing headings. It is based upon

as factual an account of human nature as any made by the Positivists or by Feuerbach, though it has more affinity with the latter than with the former. With Feuerbach, indeed, philosophy takes what we judge to be a radical turn, not only away from Hegelian Etatisme, but from every other form of Idism. For him man as an individual confronts his fellow-man as an individual, and it is from this advanced post of the Tu, or the Ego-and-the-Tu, that we must march on to the I-THOU, the EGO-TU. We may now formulate our hypothesis: man's essential nature is egotistic, and his characteristic basic need is that of socio-personal fulfilment and relationship.

Faith and Symbol: The Paris School

W. J. McELDOWNEY, LL.B.

THE Paris or Symbolo-fideist school was one of the most liberal and most influential of modern theological schools. It had its seat and origin in the Protestant Theological Faculty at Paris, associated with the University until the separation of Church and State in 1906. As its most significant name implies, its members were noted for their teaching on the relation between religious dogma and symbolism, on the one hand, and their teaching on the nature and result of faith, on the other. With the first of these characteristic teachings is particularly associated the name of August Sabatier who, originally Professor of Reformed Dogmatics at Strasbourg, found, after the Franco-Prussian War, a home and a professorial chair at Paris. During his lifetime he exercised an influence that extended far beyond the field of theology; but his main studies were in the field which French theologians of all types have made peculiarly their own—the problems raised by the conception of authority in religion. Two of his books, translated into English respectively as *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion* (1897) and *The Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit* (1904), were very influential, and gave considerable impetus to similar studies in this country, particularly on the subject of symbolism. The other element of Symbolo-Fideism, the nature and the result of faith, was worked out in great detail by Sabatier's colleague, Eugène Ménégoz, who, from 1877 onwards, held the chair of Lutheran Dogmatics at Paris. His name is not so widely known in this country as that of Sabatier, but it was he who gave definite shape to the new theology, of which he was the most active exponent.

Sabatier drew attention to the fact that, to a twofold use of the word *dogma* in Greek thought, there is a corresponding twofold use of the word in Christian theology. In one sense it had a political and authoritarian significance, designating the decrees of assemblies and kings; and this idea of authority is an essential part of the connotation of *dogma*

when the word is used by Catholics. The other use had a philosophical and doctrinal significance, denoting the characteristic doctrine of a school of thought. This is the only sense in which the word can consistently be used in Protestant theology, in so far as it has detached itself from the dogmatic foundations of Catholicism. Dogma in this sense, says Sabatier, means "the doctrinal type generally received in a Church, and publicly expressed in its liturgy, its catechisms, its official teachings and, especially, its Confession of Faith."

Dogma, however, cannot be considered apart from our theory of knowledge, which in Sabatier's case was based on Kant. All knowledge, he says, is an ensemble of judgements, but the judgements which constitute knowledge of physical facts are of a different order from those with which ethics and religion are concerned. The former are judgements of existence, based on sensations. "The destiny of this universal objective science is to progress for ever without ever being completed It not only finds an inexhaustible subject of study in the universal world; it encounters a mystery impenetrable to its methods and analyses in the very subject that creates it, and which, in creating it, remains outside the mechanism it sets in motion." (*Outlines*, p.299).

When the thinking subject considers itself, or things in relation to itself, it calls into being a second kind of judgement, a judgement according to a norm, which is itself, declaring them to be "good or bad, beautiful or ugly, rich or poor in life, harmonious or discordant." (*ibid.*). We are here dealing with a different order or category, not of number or quantity, but of estimation or value. It is in this order that religion comes to its own and establishes its kingdom. This mode of thought, of course, was not original with Sabatier; but his contribution to it consisted in a masterly analysis of the nature of religious knowledge. Religious knowledge, he said, is subjective, giving to the soul "the sense of order re-established, of health regained, of force and peace"; it is teleological, indicating the insufficiency of mechanism as a reason for things, and, above all, it is symbolic, this being a limitation forced upon it by the dualism implanted in man's existence. Religion is directed on to what is transcendent; and in order to express its content our minds must perforce rely on spatial and temporal concepts, setting forth invisible and eternal things by images drawn from sensible precepts, being compelled, therefore, to speak in parables. It is commonly recognised that terms used in religious thought—spirit, conversion, redemption, salvation, and the like—are essentially symbolical terms. The same is true of the conception we form of God himself. His transcendence lifts him above the possibility of our comprehending him as he is in himself; all that we can do is to apply to him anthropomorphic terms, such as Father, Lord, Master, Creator, and the like, symbols which enable us to form representations of God's being that have moral and religious value, and enable us, we

believe, to lay hold of some small part of his reality. A great part of the parabolical teaching of Jesus, indeed, was devoted to this very purpose.

It is a remarkable fact that whilst what was probably the most important work in the whole New Testament in the most formative period of apostolic theology, the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, abounds in expressions that call upon us to recognise the symbolic nature of religious thought, its full significance has been missed; and the word symbol itself, instead of becoming a warning against all dogmatism in the Catholic sense of the word, became synonymous with a dogmatic confession of faith; or else was used by such writers as Dionysius merely in the service of a far-fetched mysticism. It was Sabatier who first, in modern times, gave to symbolism its rightful place in Christian thought.

It does not follow, however, says Sabatier, that because symbols are inferior to the more precise ideas of science in logical clearness, they are therefore less penetrative or forceful. Scientific concepts are perforce limited to phenomena, to the mere surface of things, whilst symbols alone can effectively make us conceive the inner significance of things. "Symbols," he says, "are the only language suited to religion. We need to know that which we adore; for no one adores that of which he has no perception; but it is not less necessary that we should not comprehend it, for one does not adore that which he comprehends too clearly, because to comprehend is to dominate. Such is the twofold and contradictory condition of piety, to which symbols seem to be made expressly in order to respond." (*Outlines*, p.327).

Religion, however, is more than the adoration of eternal truth; it demands, too the satisfaction of human yearning for salvation; between these two poles circulate all the currents of religious thought and practice. The writings of Ménégoz dealing with this aspect of the thought of the Paris school are not well known in this country; but his work on the theology of the *Epistle to the Hebrews* (1894) was of great importance; whilst his general writings, collected and republished under the title, *Publications Diverses sur le Fidéisme* (1909-1921), were numerous and clear. As early as 1879, in *Réflexions sur l'Evangile du Salut*, he tried to show that according to scripture, salvation depends not on a man's beliefs, but on his religious faith, that is to say, on the consecration of his spirit to God's service.

Man's idea of God as a perfect being brings into high relief his own inadequacy and moral culpability, the natural consequence of which would be to plunge him into discouragement and pessimism. But in spite of discouragements and shortcomings, man returns again and again to the conviction that he is made for life, not death; and he seeks eagerly what he conceives as salvation or eternal life. How can this life and salvation be found? In so far as religion has reality and vigour, it cannot go far from the position set by this demand. Luther, in opposition to

the doctrine of salvation by works, as taught by the Catholic Church, found the condition of salvation to lie in having faith in the redemptive work of Jesus. Innumerable treatises have been written on the subject, but in practice they have almost invariably been vitiated because they have assumed the necessity of having a correct belief as to the nature of the personality and the work of Jesus. It is here that Ménégóz joins issue with the historic theology. He holds that in the view of Jesus and the earliest Christian teachers salvation depends only on an interior movement of the Christian's heart, being accomplished through repentance and the gift of one's will to God for his direction. This interior movement of heart, this repentance and reorientation of will, is alone entitled to be called faith; and the Christian Gospel may therefore be summed up in the words—"Salvation by faith, independently of our beliefs."

"According to the message of Christ," says Ménégóz, "the heavenly Father only demands one thing from man—his heart; but he demands it completely. He who gives his heart to God is saved, independently of rites, church observances or doctrinal beliefs. Here we have the marrow, the substance of the Gospel. It is the doctrine of fideism; it is religion itself."

Ménégóz, however, is far from denying that religious doctrines are important. Just as the heart cannot be isolated in the human organism, so this doctrine of justification by faith cannot be completely isolated in the spiritual organism of religious thought. Every element in our minds exercises a perpetual action and reaction; and the harmony of the life of the soul may be compromised by an error that may superficially appear small. True or false beliefs of all sorts exercise, for good or ill, an enormous influence on our lives, a fact which points to the necessity for a persistent search for an ever increasing measure of truth.

The idea of salvation is for the Paris school of theology, bound up with the cognate idea of the attainment of the Kingdom of God, first of all in this present world, so that His will is done here as it is in heaven; and secondly, in the life after death, when the Christian attains ever progressive realisation of the good life, the reality of which he can only haltingly conceive and practice in the life on earth.

One does not hear these thinkers of the Paris school of theology mentioned much to-day; but their influence has been very considerable, and what they taught was a new message at the time. It is said that the modernist movement in the Roman Church can be traced to their influence; but on Protestantism their influence has been permanent. Their teaching was effective to break down much of the old dogmatic structure of theology; and whether or not their names are associated with it, their thought to-day is more influential than when they were alive. Their teaching, too, is more closely akin to modern Unitarian thought than that of some we count among the greatest of our founders.

The Religion of Havelock Ellis

DONALD MULLINS

"HE was, in the finest sense of the word, humane . . . one of the finest threads in the texture of our spiritual life . . . a perpetual reminder that it is not always true that the wise want love and those who love want wisdom." Such was Middleton Murry's affectionate tribute to the memory of Havelock Ellis, who died in the summer of 1939 in that "reposeful, beautifully-wrought land" of Suffolk, where his ancestors had ministered to the spiritual needs of the people through the medium of an established church. "I would desire no finer epitaph," he once confessed, "than that it should be said of me, 'He has added a little to the sweetness of the world and a little to its light'": his life-work forms a notable contribution to the ever-growing heritage of civilisation.

Though they are by no means determining factors in personal development, heredity and early environment are influences of importance and it may be well to glance at certain aspects of Ellis' youth and adolescence. He was born into a refined home, in which the maternal element predominated, through the prolonged absences of his father, a captain, afloat on the high seas. It was also religious in what was perhaps a somewhat narrow, though not Puritanical sense. Young Havelock had no brothers as playmates and was of a markedly studious disposition. His first literary effort took the form of an essay on "The Precious Stones of the Bible," written when he was about eleven. Among the more significant contacts of his youth was his friendship with Angus MacKay, the English master at his Mitcham school, who later became an Anglican priest. "His value for me was immense," says Ellis. "he opened for me a new world of life and thought, he was exactly the liberator and guide I needed." Wide and careful reading served to extend the scope of Ellis' searching mind and when fifteen he penned a novel of 18,000 words, with the characteristic title, *An Earnest Life*. Its hero, Walter Woodleigh, was an obvious projection of the self, not least in the expressed resolve that he would become a clergyman.

Renan's *Life of Jesus* shortly became within Ellis' ken, also Bailey's poem, *Festus*, for which he felt unbounded admiration, commenting that "Bailey's idea is that evil is not sin . . . that what we call sin is merely a part of the one harmonious whole of our life which we must work out . . . he justly considers punishment is not eternal and that nothing less than the whole sum of humanity could satisfy Christ's love." Huxley's *Essays*, Chambers' *Vestiges of Creation*, Swinburne, Scott, George Eliot, Goethe, and Drysdale's *Elements of Social Science*, were

also factors in his mental growth. He noted that there were "few questions I ever took the trouble to investigate but what I came to a conclusion totally opposed to the orthodox one," though he was often convinced despite himself, becoming "miserable, both on account of myself and on that of others."

When sixteen Ellis sailed with his father to Australia, taking a post there as a teacher. Here, in the "beautiful sun-suffused land over which the wattle throws its gracious, drooping, golden blossoms," he made a pregnant resolve and gained a vital experience, affecting the whole tenor of his future life. The natural adolescent curiosity and bewilderment as to the nature of sex became a challenge to an intense and probing mind and Ellis determined to devote himself to research in what was then a largely unexplored field, so as to "spare the youth of future generations the trouble and perplexity which ignorance caused me." "Love and religion," he has said, "are the two most volcanic emotions to which the human organism is liable." He had read Strauss' *The Old Faith and the New* and had accepted its conclusions. His orthodox convictions had been relinquished, but he was left desolate, feeling like a homeless child in a universe which seemed "a sort of factory, filled by an inextricable web of wheels, looms and flying shuttles." In his dismay he pored over Shelley and found consolation in Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, but the measure of his heaviness of soul is expressed in his *De Profundis*—"Long and weary is life's race and I desire to rest." He later came to re-value this phase of his development, declaring that "the man who has never wrestled with his early faith, not truly his own, has missed a moral and intellectual discipline, which may mark him for life and make his work ineffective . . . it is along a road from misery and despair that the summits of glory are reached." Laurence Housman has in like manner averred that "nothing in a man's life needs more revision than the conscience with which others have provided him."

"Conversion," Ellis says, "occurs especially in those who have undergone long and torturing disquietude, coming at last as the spontaneous resolution of all their doubts, the eruption of a soothing flood of peace, the silent explosion of an inner light." "The supreme expression of the religious consciousness lies always in an intuition of union with the world," and the turmoil of Ellis' being was followed by a new vision, a mystical re-integration, attendant upon a perusal of James Hinton's *Life in Nature*. Hinton was an eminent physician and a pioneer thinker who rejected mechanistic theories of the universe, anticipating the Eddingtons of to-day who find themselves confronted with "an enigma at once wonderful and perturbing, enveloped in profound mystery." His book, in Ellis' words, was "the surgeon's touch," restoring inner harmony—"Myself was one with the Not-Self, my will one with the universal Will. I seemed to walk in light, my feet scarcely touched the ground, I had entered a new world,

henceforth I could face life with confidence and joy." Looking back upon the experience forty years later he says—"The joy of that Beauty has been with me ever since and will remain with me till I die. All my life has been the successive quiet realisations in the small things of the world of that primary realisation in the greatest thing in the world; however my life may be shadowed with care and my heart laden with memories, the essential problems are solved." "Beauty is the end of living, not Truth. When I was a youth, by painful struggle, by deliberate courage, by intellectual effort, I won my way to what seemed to be Truth. . . . It brought me no joy. . . . Yet in so seeking I had been following the right road. No intellectual striving will bring us to the heart of things, we can only lay ourselves open to the influences of the world and the living intuition will be born in its own due course. I cannot say that Beauty is the aim of living, because the greatest ends are never the result of aiming; they are infinite and our aims can only be finite." Ellis' affinities with Plotinus are evident in his tendency to stress the concept of Ultimate Being as Beauty.

The idea that "it is by indirection that we find direction out" recurs frequently in Ellis' thought—"it is in the choice and regulation of our errors, in our readiness to accept ever closer approximations to the unattainable reality, that we think and live rightly." Here he shows kinship with the eminent Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who says that "the history of thought . . . is made up of a series of scandals for commonsense, each of which is followed by a higher reintegration and conquest, a victory for commonsense . . . those difficult discoveries of which history has most need to grow are seldom made without the help and energy of error and disaster. . . . The purifications which would have saved everything come after all has gone to ruin and begun to bloom again." So again Ellis says—"We may find in our defects and deficiencies the germs of new growths out of which may develop the finest qualities. I am never tired of asserting that on the foundation of our failures we may establish our finest successes." In the sphere of sex, he says, "many mistakes are being made, for the deepest facts can only be learnt by experience and experience can only come slowly.

"The absence of flaw in beauty," Ellis remarks, "is itself a flaw . . . it is the ripeness of Raphael's perfection which falls short of Perfection. In all Perfection that satisfies we demand the possibility of a Beyond, which unfolds a further Perfection. It is not the fully-blown rose which entrances, but rather that which in its half-blown loveliness suggests a Perfection which no full-blown rose ever reached. In that rose is the symbol of all vitally beautiful things." In his philosophising Ellis turns to the beauty of the visible world for the symbols of his thought. For him "the simplest things of life are the greatest miracles, chinks that look out into Infinity," much as for Maritain, who can turn from a

consideration of the abstruse theories of Planck and Einstein to assure us that "one cherry between the lips holds more mystery than the whole idealist metaphysic." Ellis' reaction against the tendency to look upon history as a progress towards a prim perfection rather than as "the pillar of a Glorious Flame" is in some degree shared by Nicholas Berdyaev. One of the most profound of modern thinkers, Berdyaev sees the stressing of content rather than of form as an essential feature of Christian culture—"in which all achievements are symbolic, tending to be always imperfect and lacking in clarity, presupposing a form denoting the existence of an Absolute beyond the limits of a given terrestrial achievement. Gothic architecture is essentially imperfect; it aspires to the heavens quivering with anguish and nostalgia, and proclaims that the achievement of perfection is possible only there. An interior lack of soul becomes apparent in Raphael's masterpieces, which otherwise succeed in achieving perfection of composition." Of Amiel, Ellis writes—"a love of perfection, a disdain for all that is below, the highest, a fine scrupulosity or conscience, have been his ruin," leading him to an attitude of impotence in face of reality. Maritain refers to this trait as "a platonism which will always lead with an infallible rectitude to non-existence." History to him is "the march of an unhappy humanity towards a most mysterious deliverance, of progresses towards good made amid evil and by evil means. The fear of soiling ourselves in entering history is a pharisaical one." It is a related tendency to that asceticism which, says Berdyaev, "by making sin man's only preoccupation, reduces him to the state of a negative being, hostile to life."

Religion for Ellis is "a joyous expansion of the whole soul, the stretching forth of our hands toward the illimitable." It is therefore the principle of growth and life. "Creative movement is the proof of perfection of being," says Berdyaev, "the personality can only be realised by self-transcendence. God needs only men's ascension, their ecstatic transcendence of their limitations." (Both Ellis and Berdyaev testify to the liberating influence of laughter). Delisle Burns sees the idea of expansion as vital to a healthy society—"There is always some horizon at every stage of progress, but it is never a fixed limitation upon our powers of knowledge and action. As we move, it moves. The future of civilised life cannot be calculated in terms of any dialectic, as of Hegel or Marx."

From Heraclitus to Blake, from Nicolas of Cusa to Robertson of Brighton and Keyserling, there have been thinkers who have sensed the essential element of conflict in life. Ellis' thought is suffused with that recognition. "Life, even in the plant," he says, "is a tension of opposing forces. Whatever is vital is contradictory, and if of two views we wish to find out which is the richer and more fruitful we ought perhaps to ask ourselves which embodies the most contradictions." That this should be so in one who has impressed many by his serenity may seem strange—

but it is a conflict which is resolved in a reconciling synthesis which he has in mind. His favourite symbols of this concept are those of the arch, maintained by a balance of opposing thrusts and of the dance, in which "the maximum conflicting muscular action is held in the most fluidly harmonious balance." Civilisation, he avers, depends on a strenuous diversity, the finest human development needing the final harmony between the two extremes of Individualism and Socialism. He regards Art as the harmonised conflict between Realism and Idealism, the discovery and the creation of things, and he refers to the tension present in men of genius and the anthropologist's evidence of the value to civilisation of the contact of cultures. Berdyaev similarly declares that this principle of contradiction "is destined to play an important part in the development of future thought." "History," he says, "depends on the union of the dynamic creative element with the conservative, accepted the sacred heritage of the past." "God is the co-existence of antitheses," he maintains, "and the spiritual life an inner struggle, an experience of freedom, a clash of opposing principles." He regards Jacob Boehme as having made a profound contribution to thought in his conception of a state in the depths of the Absolute, beyond good and evil—"the source of tragic conflict, movement and passion in the divine life itself."

Ellis concurs with Keyserling in looking upon marriage as a state of tension, to be valued rather by the intensity and enrichment of life which flows from it rather than by a superficial stressing of happiness, which is not won by seeking. Since civilisation increases differentiation, he favours the most complete facility of divorce, while deprecating resort to what is ultimately a confession of failure. The four volumes of this erudite and illuminating *Psychology of Sex* witness to the successful issue of the task which he set himself in early youth. His broad and balanced outlook enables him to view aberrations with understanding, to him they are not so much perversions as deviations from the norm. He does not share Shaw's opinion that love is "the most violent, insane, delusive and transient of passions." "When the youth awakes to find a woman is beautiful he finds, to his amazement, that the world also is beautiful," he says. "Religion, like love, develops and harmonises our rarest and most extravagant emotions. It exalts us above the commonplace routine of daily life and makes us supreme over the world." Something of his attitude to sex is revealed in his comments on a nude dancer—"To see Bianca Stella truly was to realise that it is not desire but a sacred awe which nakedness inspires, an intoxication of the spirit rather than of the senses, no flame of lust but rather a purifying and exalting fire." The lover's heart goes out, he says, "to every creature that shares the loved one's delicious humanity; henceforth there is nothing human that he cannot touch with reverence and love."

Ellis' thought is specially stimulating concerning what he terms "the art of morals." He points out that in this sphere we are influenced largely by the Hebrew and Roman, rather than by the Greek outlook. He rejects the Mosaic and Kantian conception of morality as "a code of rigid and inflexible rules arbitrarily ordained and to be blindly obeyed." "In our human world the precision of mechanism is for ever impossible. Life must always be a great adventure, with risks on every hand—a clear-sighted eye, a many-sided sympathy, a fine daring, an endless patience, are for ever necessary to all good living." He considers that the Jesuits rendered a great service to civilisation—"To establish that there can be no single inflexible moral code for all individuals has been, and indeed remains, a difficult and delicate task, yet the more profoundly one considers it the more clearly it becomes visible that what once seemed a dead and rigid code of morality must more and more become a living act of casuistry." He refers to Aristotle's dictum that in assessing the moral value of any action we should endeavour to envisage its widest context. "We are accustomed to suppose that a moral action is much easier to judge than a picture of Cezanne. We do not dream of bringing the same patient and attentive, as it were aesthetic, spirit to life as we bring to painting." Morality is, in a sense, the grammar of life, in which, as in literature, "the logic of thought takes precedence of the rules and in which the syntax must ever be moulded afresh on the sensibility of the individual writer." Maritain holds a similar view—"nothing is more difficult to handle than morality, above all since it became Kantian in so many hands. The sorest disasters can result when moral laws external to life are imposed on the amoral movement of life. Pharisaic morality is purely formal and geometric, denying at once nature and life. . . God brings forth good from evil. Moral pharisaists imagine that morality measures our acts . . . by a forest of abstract formulae which must be copied to the letter. But its principles are neither theorems nor idols, using proximate rules and prescriptions (never set out in advance) of the virtue of prudence . . . not seeking to devour human life but to build it up." In the same way, remarks Berdyaev, "the subjugation of spirit is manifest in those who follow the letter of the law, in legalistic morality."

"Every religion," Ellis says, "begins as the glorious flame of a lovely human personality." And he loves to think of those unknown folk, "tiny indistinguishable rays in the great flame of life," who have inspired and helped him. "What I ask of each individual is that he should be a perpetual and unique miracle." He is sensitive to "the heightened power which those we love possess when they are dead; such persons may be closer to us and more alive than the people we see and hear and touch every day." It is the delicacy, breadth and insight of his perceptions which, for Dean Inge and many others, makes him one of the most significant thinkers of the modern world.

"In Memoriam" A Hundred Years After

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AT the beginning of June, 1850, there appeared from the London publishing house of Edward Moxon a volume of elegiac verses entitled *In Memoriam, A.H.H.* It consisted of an introductory poem of eleven stanzas addressed to "Immortal Love," in which the author affirmed a belief and trust in the goodness of God, commended an open-minded but reverential attitude to new knowledge, and finally counselled an attitude of "faith and faith alone" in those matters where doubts assail us and proof is impossible. This was followed by one hundred and thirty-one brief cantos in varying moods and on a diversity of subjects, though all held together by one central theme. Some of the early ones were clearly laments for the death of a friend; others were rather morbidly introspective. Then at a later stage there were heart-searchings and questionings prompted by religious doubts: What is the purpose of life? Is death the end? And if it is not, can we hope that "beyond the veil" we shall retain our personal identity so that friend will know friend, or are the souls of the departed merged into one universal and eternal "general soul"? Can we maintain many of our traditional religious beliefs in the face of scientific discovery? And when we reflect on the extent of human suffering, of unhappiness and bereavement in the world, or of promising young lives cut off prematurely, before their talents, supposedly divinely given, could come to fruition, to say nothing of the ferocity of nature, apparently a-moral and to all appearances "red in tooth and claw," can we be so sure that God is all-wise, all-good and all-powerful? Finally there was an epilogue or concluding poem which commenced as a marriage lay for the poet's sister and finished in a prophetic vein with a vision of the emergence in the fullness of time of a nobler and wiser type of humanity, and the consummation of the divine purpose in

That far off, divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.

The volume was anonymous, but it soon became known that the author was Alfred Tennyson, whose name already was well known amongst those of the early Victorian poets, and that the initials A.H.H. were those of his friend Arthur Henry Hallam (son of the renowned historian), who had died suddenly, at the age of twenty-two, in Vienna seventeen years earlier. At first the critics were not too kind to it. One

found it confused in thought and uncertain in technique; another was of the opinion that the author was "clearly the widow of a military man." Certain clergymen of the Establishment, who seemed to discern in it the influence of Kingsley and F. D. Maurice, were afraid that it might encourage scepticism amongst the weaker minded, and therefore hesitated to recommend it. But the general public took the poem to its heart, and before long everyone—poets and novelists, professional people and scholars, clergymen and politicians, students at the universities and business men from the new rising mercantile middle-class, were reading and discussing *In Memoriam*; and their verdict upon it was almost unanimously a favourable, nay almost a eulogistic one. The Prince Consort, who had accepted a copy, was much impressed. George Gissing later described it as "one of the books that have made me what I am." The renowned architect, Sir James Knowles, later to become responsible for designing and supervising the building of Tennyson's house, Aldworth, declared that "when I was little more than a boy I came by chance upon a copy of *In Memoriam*, then just published anonymously. I was quite entirely ignorant and indifferent in those days about all poetry . . . but I was so impressed . . . that I could not put the book down until I had read it all through from end to end. I was caught up and enthralled by its spirit, and my eyes seemed suddenly opened on a new world. It made an epoch in my life and an ineffaceable impression."

When Alfred (later Canon) Ainger lighted upon it, according to his biographer, Edith Sitchell, "he felt he had discovered a new world. He and his friend, Richard Brown, together with two others, would take the book out on spring afternoons to the terrace of Somerset House and read it together there, 'sitting by the stone lions and looking across the river to the Surrey hills,' And after that some volume of Tennyson was never far from Alfred's hands."

Of better-known contemporaries who have left their opinions upon record, Charlotte Brontë alone was critical. "I have read Tennyson's *In Memoriam*, or rather part of it," she wrote to Mrs. Gaskell on August 27, 1850. "I closed the book when I got about half way. It is beautiful; it is mournful; it is monotonous. Many of the feelings bear in their utterance the stamp of truth; yet if Arthur Hallam had been somewhat nearer Alfred Tennyson—his brother instead of his friend—I should have distrusted this rhymed and measured and printed monument of grief. What change the lapse of years may work I do not know; but it seems to me that bitter sorrow, while recent, does not flow out in verse." This comment, was, however, if honest, not typical either of the contemporary estimate or of the opinion of the next two generations, who came to regard the poem with a reverence second only to that reserved for the Bible and the *Pilgrim's Progress*. But it did anticipate to some extent the judgments of the anti-Tennysonian reaction of the years between 1918 and 1939.

The genesis of the poem and the history of its composition are well enough known. The friendship between Hallam and Tennyson, begun at Cambridge, where both were members of the "Apostles," was continued afterwards when Tennyson had left the university and Hallam was in London studying for the bar. He was undoubtedly a young man of great talent, of charming manner and of strong personality—we have the testimony of others besides Tennyson for that—and the son of the Lincolnshire rector, conscious of his own inferiority, almost worshipped him on this side idolatry. He refers to him in one canto of *In Memoriam* as "the man I held as half divine." He was "a soul of nobler tone," and "more than my brothers are to me"; and at another stage of the poem he reveals the secret of the relationship between them:

He was rich, where I was poor,
And he supplied my want the more
As his unlikeness fitted mine.

During his university days, and after, Hallam visited the Tennyson household at Somersby as a welcome guest and at length became engaged to Tennyson's sister Emily. But in the early part of 1833 his health began to decline. His father took him on a continental holiday for rest and recuperation, but while in Vienna, on September 15th, 1833, he suddenly collapsed and died. When the tidings reached Somersby they left Tennyson grief-stricken; and to him fell the task of breaking the heavy news to his sister and sustaining her in her sorrow through the weeks and months that followed.

The earliest of the poems that constitute the elegy (though not the prologue) seem to have been written within a few weeks of the receipt of the tragic news—certainly before the interment of Hallam's body in Clevedon churchyard on January 3rd, 1834. Others were added periodically up to 1842 or 1843, the whole being inscribed in "a long, butcher ledger-like book" in a quite unmethodical and haphazard fashion. "The general way of its being written," his son Hallam Tennyson declared later in the *Life* of his father, "was so queer that if there was a blank space he would put in a poem." It was not, apparently, until 1849, when he wrote what now stands as the introductory canto, that he thought of publishing them in their entirety. Indeed, considering the professed purpose of some of the verses—to perpetuate and keep green the memory of his friend—he seems to have been incredibly lax in his care of the accumulating manuscript. He lent the ledger out to friends and then forgot who had it or whether it had been returned to him; he went on holiday supposing he had taken it with him and then found that he must have left it behind somewhere; even at home he was apt to mislay it. Indeed it was only through Coventry Patmore, who went to Tennyson's lodgings in his absence and, in defiance of a protesting landlady, searched the place till he discovered it in a cupboard amongst pots

of jam and other food, that it was rescued from being irretrievably lost. Derek Patmore tells the story in his *Life and Times of Coventry Patmore*, from which the following extract (Coventry Patmore's own account) is quoted: "Tennyson had lodgings up two pairs of stairs in Mornington Place, Hampstead Road, and I, who was lately married, lived hard by. We used to dine together two or three times a week. He often read me bits of *In Memoriam*, then unpublished. After he had left his lodgings three or four weeks I received a letter from where he was staying in the country asking me to go to his old lodgings and recover the manuscript of *In Memoriam*—a long, thin volume like a butcher's account book. He had left it in a closet in which he kept his tea and bread-and-butter. The landlady assured me that no such book had been left there, and objected to my going to see; but I insisted, and, pushing by her, ran upstairs and found the manuscript. Tennyson afterwards gave this volume to Sir John Simeon, to whom I also gave the letter asking me to look for it."

Publication came at the psychological moment. Not only did it bring the poet commendation from so many quarters—including Buckingham Palace—and so, despite the rather cavalier treatment by certain critics, add considerably to his reputation in the world of letters, but when, on the death of Wordsworth,¹ the Laureateship fell vacant, it was bestowed (rumour has it at the intercession of the Prince Consort) upon Tennyson. And finally he was enabled, at the age of forty-one, to marry the lady to whom he had been betrothed for some years. So he faced the future with a home of his own, a secure if not a large income, and an assured place in English poetry as well as in the heart of the people and of his sovereign, though he had not yet become quite the cult or the institution that he was destined to be by the time that he died in 1892. He made himself, as few other poets ever have done, the spokesman of his age. He took his duties as Laureate, as he took himself and his problems, seriously. What *In Memoriam* had initiated, the Arthurian cycle, *The Idylls of the King*, completed, and when he was raised to the peerage in 1884 it seemed but the long overdue recognition of the unique place that he had come to hold in English life and letters for the past quarter of a century.

Looking back at *In Memoriam* after the lapse of a hundred years, we can see it with different eyes from those of his contemporaries, and we may perhaps be inclined to agree with Charlotte Brontë rather than with the more eulogistic estimates of the day. Even G. F. Bradby, who confessed that in his earlier life he "devoured it with a reverent and uncritical enthusiasm, and believed it to be one of the profoundest utter-

¹ Actually Wordsworth had died a few weeks before the appearance of *In Memoriam*, but there was some delay in filling the vacancy. It was first offered to Samuel Rogers, who declined it on grounds of age, and it was bestowed upon Tennyson in November.

ances of the human spirit," was forced to admit that when he re-read it after almost half a century it was "not big as it was, and not so convincing."² The poet does seem to parade his grief a little indecently by modern standards; his obsession with death and the beyond, and the fascination exercised over his imagination by the "shadow cloaked from head to foot" do strike us as rather unhealthy and the products of a mind turned too much inward upon itself; the praises lavished upon a young man who had not much more than attained his majority do strike one as rather fulsome, while the problems over which he worries and which caused him such heart-searchings seem to us less important than they did to Tennyson; and we cannot but feel that he never honestly faces up to them but falls back on sentimentalised commonplaces to bolster up an orthodoxy of which, in his heart of hearts, he was not at all sure. His "faith" seems negative rather than positive, a means of escape rather than a courageous affirmation. As in his childhood he had sheltered behind his parents and in his university days had looked to Hallam for guidance, consolation and assurance, so now, in the face of intellectual doubts and spiritual questionings, he sought refuge in "faith." He might confidently affirm that

There lives more faith in honest doubt,

Believe me, than in half the creeds,

but it is difficult to feel that he ever really discovered it. He might flatter himself that "like Paul with beasts, I fought with death," but unlike Paul he was not really victor in the fight. Rather he beat an honourable and respectable retreat. "The rather fretful mystic," writes Professor Ifor Evans,³ "the child before God, terrified of this universe and distrustful of the growing evidence of science, the infant crying for divine guidance, such is the poet of *In Memoriam*, and the portrait, if not always attractive, is very truthful."

That is probably what many modern readers of the poem will feel; yet to judge it thus is not really fair to Tennyson or to those of his contemporaries who found in it comfort and consolation, for we are judging it on the standards and from the point of view of our own age, which is less disquieted by the findings of the scientists, and not on those of the mid-nineteenth century. It is like ridiculing an infant for his childish fears and anxieties; they are only childish to the adult who has grown out of them; to the child himself they are real enough. Tennyson addressed himself to the average man, not to the professional thinker or theologian. If he took his religious doubts seriously (and there is evidence in the early poem *The Two Voices* that he had begun to brood over these things even before the death of Hallam), so did his age. Nine years were yet to elapse before Darwin published his *Origin of Species*,

² See essay on *In Memoriam* in his volume *The Brontës and Other Essays*.

³ B. Ifor Evans. *A Short History of English Literature*.

and the greater part of *In Memoriam* was written, though it had not yet been committed to print, several years prior to the appearance of Chambers' *Vestiges of Creation*, but the new doctrines were already in the air and were agitating more minds than Tennyson's; and if some of the issues discussed in the poem now seem somewhat time-worn and remote, we must remember that to the men of 1850—and even before—the challenge of science to religion was just as real, just as disturbing, and just as fundamental as the challenge of Marxist dialectical materialism is to us. If the preoccupation with mortality and what lies beyond the grave seems unnatural to a twentieth century mind, we should make allowance for the fact that in the days of large families and a high death-rate, when even amongst the better-off classes many people did not live beyond what we should call middle-age, and early, as well as frequent bereavement was a fairly common occurrence in most families, death was something much more real than it is to us. Again, to an age which was individualist in the extreme, this question whether or not we retained our personal identity and individuality in the hereafter was, no doubt, a matter of consequence. And if we find it incredible that anyone could cherish the memory of a dead friend for seventeen years, or feel that Tennyson loved to dwell upon his grief until he had made something of a companion of it, we have only to recall Queen Victoria's stubborn refusal to forget the death of her Consort, to realise that it was not something peculiar to the author of *In Memoriam*. The perpetuation of grief for the dead was one of the Victorian decencies that went with widow's weeds and eulogistic memorial tablets. Besides, Tennyson's grief does, as a matter of fact, undergo a change. It is, as he expresses it, "a grief that changed to something else," and that something else is the hope of immortality and a faith in love as the ultimate principle of the universe.

Because it was not published until the poet was over forty, we are apt to regard it, and to judge it, as the work of a middle-aged man. It was not; the greater part of it, composed between 1833 and 1842, was the work of a comparatively young man, as the writer himself reminds us when he refers to many of the poems as "confusions of a wasted youth." In the early cantos his sorrow is turned inwards and he refuses to take comfort. Perhaps it was not alone the death of his friend that was accountable for his melancholy; that catastrophe came as a final blow from the hand of an unkind fate. He had long been temperamentally subject to fits of depression. Two years previously he had lost his father and recently the family had had financial worries. His own health was not too robust—a little later he had trouble with his eyesight—and, always sensitive to criticism, he had had his second volume of poems (1832) severely handled by the reviewers. By the twenty-seventh canto, however, he has come to feel that sorrow itself may have a purpose, and is indeed the complement of love, for only

those who have truly loved can truly experience the poignancy and bitterness of grief; and so he rises to the conviction that

'Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.

The introductory canto, be it remembered, was the last to be written. Seven years separate it from the latest of the elegies proper. It should therefore be regarded as the poet's final comment on his work as a whole, and it is the three themes Love, Faith, and Knowledge tempered by reverence that dominate this canto.

We have but faith; we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see;
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness: let it grow.
Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul according well,
May make one music as before
Forgive my grief for one removed,
Thy creature, whom I found so fair.
I trust he lives in thee, and there
I find him worthier to be loved.
Forgive these wild and wandering cries,
Confusions of a wasted youth;
Forgive them where they fail in truth,
And in thy wisdom make me wise.

Tennyson's final appeal is to the feelings, not to the intellect. The "little systems" of the philosophers and theologians he dismisses, not, perhaps, as irrelevant, but unhelpful in that they are something spun out of the brain and not the result of experience. Faith, in the last resort, is a matter of the heart, not of the head.

I found Him not in world or sun,
Or eagle's wing or insect's eye;
Nor thro' the questions men may try,
The petty cobwebs we have spun:
If e'er when faith had fall'n asleep,
I heard a voice 'believe no more'
And heard an ever-breaking shore
That tumbled in the Godless deep;
A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And like a man in wrath the heart
Stood up and answered 'I have felt.'

Yet he was sufficiently the child of his age not to turn his back entirely upon the speculations of contemporary science. Indeed, perhaps one explanation of the popularity of his poem in its own day was the fact that the poet played safe and adopted a compromise. There was something in his verses for all to applaud and nothing to offend anyone, save those who were fanatics or bigots in one direction or another. The

orthodox he satisfied by coming down ultimately, if a little uncertainly and timidly, on the side of orthodoxy and the traditional view, yet at the same time he assures the doubter that he has no need to be ashamed of his doubts. Doubt is not "devil-born" and may, indeed, prove to be the ground from which springs a deeper faith.

He gives a guarded welcome to knowledge and the results of scientific discovery and looks forward to an extension of their bounds; yet he utters a warning against the accumulation of knowledge without wisdom. With his trust in the simple impulses of the human heart he ranges himself with the common man, but at the same time in his idealised picture of Arthur Hallam he reflects the hero-worship to which the Victorians were much given, while in his fanciful representation of his dead friend, had he lived, as the family man, the statesman and the empire builder, a combination of the fine old English gentleman and "the pillar of a people's hope, the centre of a world's desire," he manifested other Victorian traits. There is, too, his trust in the ultimate triumph of good and his belief (again typically nineteenth century) in progress and the upward march of man; and all this is pervaded by a homely domesticity through the description of Christmas and New Year festivities, family parties, summer walks through the woodlands and picnics in the meadows. His son said that the 'I' of the poem is not always the poet, but sometimes the voice of the human race speaking through him. It might have been truer to say the voice of his generation accepted during its author's lifetime. These are not literary judgments, but then it was not primarily for its literary qualities that the poem was accepted during the author's lifetime.

In Memoriam ranks amongst the half-dozen great English elegies; but as elegy *qua* elegy I find it difficult to give it so high a place amongst them as earlier criticism was wont to do. It is diffuse; it is over long; it sometimes degenerates into banality and sentimentalised piety, while its hero (if one may use that term), overdrawn as a paragon of excellence and an epitome of all the virtues, is a fictitious one, largely the creation of the poet's own imagination. It has not the strength, the depth or the universality of *Lycidas*; it lacks both the unity and the restrained dignity of Arnold's *Thyrsis*; we miss the high imaginative and spiritual qualities of Shelley's *Adonais*. Indeed, it is difficult to think of *In Memoriam* as a whole; and in view of the manner in which it was written one wonders whether we were ever intended to. It is memorable rather than striking and picturesque stanzas or phrases—"blasts that blow the poplars white," "laburnums dropping wells of fire," "drowned in yonder living blue, the lark becomes a sightless song"—for quotable lines and couplets, for certain cantos which have made so popular an appeal that they have been included in hymn books (not by any means a guarantee that they are great poetry), and, of course, for its characteristic

verse-form and its simplicity and directness of diction. Here, as in other poems, Tennyson shows himself the master of the descriptive sketch. He can create impression and atmosphere by the skilful selection of a few essential features, especially when the subject is a storm.

Tonight the winds begin to rise
 And roar from yonder dropping day :
 The last red leaf is whirled away,
 The rooks are blown about the skies ;
 The forests cracked, the waters curled,
 The cattle huddled on the lea ;
 And wildly dashed on tower and tree
 The sunbeam strikes along the wold.

Other instances could be quoted did space permit. These are all poetic excellencies; but they are not the excellencies of elegy as such.

Tennyson, I have said above, came down finally, if rather timidly, on the side of orthodoxy, at least in the fundamentals; yet later, it is said, he declared that he feared he had given a wrong impression of his position in *In Memoriam*, and even thought of writing a companion-piece to clarify it. This he never did, but his grandson, Sir Charles Tennyson, has shown in a recent biography⁴ that he had some sympathy with the Unitarian position and that one reason for the interruption of his engagement to Emily Selwood (whom he later married) was her parents' misgivings about the "liberal" tendencies of his religious beliefs. He knew Martineau and read his works, and in later years expressed approval of much that he found in *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, but (and this seems characteristically Tennysonian) he thought it would have been better left unpublished, since it might unsettle people's minds. This comment perhaps provides the key to his dilemma in *In Memoriam*, which, when we consider it, is as interesting for what it omits as for what it includes. Scarcely a single one of the dogmatic teachings of the orthodox churches of the day is there; there is no mention of the Trinity, none of the Atonement, none of the Virgin Birth, and only one rather ambiguous reference to a miracle (that of the raising of Lazarus). There are several Christmas and New Year poems, but no Easter poems. In a work so much concerned with the question of continued life after death one would have supposed that, to one brought up in a clerical household and still, outwardly at least, professing allegiance to the Establishment, the teaching of the Church upon the Ressurrection would have been all-important; as a matter of fact, it is entirely ignored—as indeed is the teaching of the Church on most of the questions that Tennyson discusses. His appeal is to an inward, not an outward authority, to "the truths deep-seated in our mystic frame," and to

what we have
 The likest God within the soul.

⁴ *Alfred Tennyson*, by Sir Charles Tennyson (Macmillan, 1949).

Jesus is mentioned but little, and when he is it is upon his life, work and teaching, not upon his death or upon views concerning his person that the poet dwells. He is the supreme exemplar of Immortal Love manifested in humanity, who

wrought

With human hands the creed of creeds,

In loveliness of perfect deeds,

More strong than all poetic thought.

"He (Tennyson) was not really a Christian," writes a modern American critic,⁵ "though Stopford Brooke tried valiantly to prove that he was." It is a startling statement; even Emily Selwood, despite her early misgivings, did not go so far as that, for a pre-view of *In Memoriam* reassured her. But then perhaps the same critic would claim that Stopford Brooke was "not really a Christian" either!

During the inter-war years it was fashionable to contrast Tennyson's approach to the spiritual problems of his age with that of Browning, usually to the disadvantage of Tennyson. It was, in part, the inevitable reaction from the unthinking adulation of an earlier generation, and like most reactions it went to the other extreme. To-day we can perhaps take a more balanced view and do Tennyson justice without belittling his deficiencies and shortcomings. Browning's confident optimism no longer has quite the glamour and appeal that it once had. It strikes us as a little facile, though perhaps not unnatural from one whom life, on the whole, had treated well. It is as though he were saying to the reader in the words of Abt Vogler of his own poem,

God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear;

The rest may reason and welcome; 'tis we musicians know.

Tennyson's view was that we cannot know; we can only trust. And if his trust sometimes verges upon wishful thinking and his faith has no great depth or any very solid foundation, if he is too often inclined to treat assumption as proved fact and to use a vivid or striking analogy to disguise a rather thin argument, he at least reveals himself in his elegy as nowhere else. His contemporaries went to *In Memoriam* for its teaching, and many found that teaching satisfying and reassuring. We shall value it rather for its felicity of phrase, its inspired flashes of natural description (let us remember that Tennyson was a countryman writing for a public which was still predominantly a rural one), its occasional vivid pictures, and above all for its revelation of a soul saddened, bewildered and a little afraid, looking back at a past which seemed lost irrevocably, regarding the future with something of apprehension, and facing the mystery of life and the impact made upon traditional values and traditional modes of thought by new doctrines and a sense of personal loss. It is a situation that many of us know, in a different setting, today. Our

⁵ *Tennyson Sixty Years After*, by Paull F. Baum (O.U.P. 1949).

faith, too, is challenged. The age in which we once lived, in which our hopes were centred and our ideals were born, is dead. Memories and echoes of it come back to us like echoes of the voice and visions of the features of one whose life, once so intimately interwoven with our own, has now passed to the beyond. Our old belief in popular democracy and the commonsense of the common man is beginning to strike us as a little naïve. We suffer from a sense of insecurity and uncertainty. We long for reassurance about the future and about the survival of the society which generations of our predecessors laboured in hope to build up, as Tennyson longed for reassurance about personal survival of the individual soul. And in our situation most of us can give no other answer than that which Tennyson gave in his : a stronger faith in what we conceive to be the ultimate and eternal verities, a re-affirmation of our belief in Love as the essence of the universe, and a trust that "somehow good will be the final goal of ill."

That we may lift from out of dust
 A voice as unto him that hears,
 A cry above the conquer'd years,
 To one that with us works, and trust,
 With faith that comes of self-control,
 The truths that never can be proved
 Until we close with all we loved,
 And all we flow from, soul in soul.

Illimitable Fields

JOSEPH WICKSTEED, M.A.

A Review of THE ENGLISH MYSTICS by Gerald Bullett

MICHAEL JOSEPH 12/6. 229 pp.

THIS is a book of distinction by a writer hitherto known for his many delightful and always original novels : his anthologies almost equally original in their selections : his own poems grave and gay : his verse translations from a Chinese writer : and other forms of literary art.

But this book on a singularly interesting theme connected with our own country reveals Mr. Bullett in a new phase of depth and it is no exaggeration to say of Mastership. I think anyone interested in the curiously persistent vein of a certain type of religious experience characteristic of these Islands will find that Mr. Bullett's book has opened new gateways for us into both history and religion.

I forget who it was said of Cromwell that the practical mystic is the most dangerous of men : dangerous, that is, to those who rely upon the more palpably obvious facts of life. And in Mr. Bullett's wide survey of a confessedly rare type of experience it is constantly brought home to the reader not only how indifferent the "Holy Spirit"

is in the choice of its vehicles, but how those with apparently least means (or even desire) to propagate their faith do in fact leave behind them a new influence of mysteriously widespread significance.

But even more surprising is the fact that creeds and philosophies appear to have little more to do with the deepest of all human experiences than the robes wherewith mankind adorns or screens its bodily frame have to do with what Blake calls the Human *form* Divine. Beneath all our prides and professions, the prophet and the pedlar, the scholar and the tramp, the learned and the simple, are alike varieties evolved from one type, and as such these speak to one another across the abysses of Time and Space, of status and upbringing, in familiar accents.

Bunyan describes how in the depth of his spiritual distress he came across a book so old that it was "ready to fall piece from piece if I did but turn it over." It was a translation—Luther's *Grace Abounding*—but there he found words so suited to his condition—"so largely and profoundly handled, as if it had been written out of my heart."

Mr. Bullett, while carefully avoiding the highest or more dazzling lights in his story, gives his readers intimate pictures of the men and women he introduces into the book in such a way as to make them our own permanent friends. These, of course, take us back into strangely different social atmospheres in our own islands, and across the seas to other lands and earlier ages. But we never lose the sense of moving amongst friends and kinsmen so that it is an equal delight to listen again to George Fox—to Blake—to Wordsworth—and to Jeffries—Scotus Erigena—Plato and Plotinus—to make acquaintance with Julian of Norwich and her fourteenth century confrères—to dwell for a time with the Cambridge "Platonists"—or the Poets Herbert, Vaughan and Henry Moore—to listen to the words spoken by that remarkable man Cudworth to the House of Commons in 1647—and very much other good company.

But notwithstanding the illimitable fields Mr. Bullett's book opens for us it leaves in the reader's mind no sense of confusion, but of something richly coherent and even familiar. It would be dangerous to attempt to summarize this, but I must try to put down something of what it has meant to myself. This is certainly not the offer of a complete or satisfying philosophy—still less of a conventional *credo* or confession. It merely confirms a bed-rock conviction I have long held in common, I fancy, with most of my countrymen, that the altruistic forces in the world—possibly in the Universe—are in their essence cumulative—whereas the purely egoistic ones are mutually destructive.

This is a deliberate simplification of our human problems, and it may require a long—a very long—period of Time to bring about anything approaching its full realisation. But there have never been long periods of history in any part of our planet that have been wholly without evidence that there is something Eternal in the human heart and intellect as such.